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I. Introduction 
Over one quarter of Americans suffer from a mental or addictive 
disorder in any given year.
1
  The World Health Organization has found that 
mental and behavioral disorders trail only cardiovascular disease and cancer 
as a cause of disability and premature death in the United States.
2
  Recent 
events, including multiple mass shootings such as those at Newtown, 
Connecticut and the Washington Navy Yard,
3
 have focused public and 
                                                                                                     
 1. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE 
SURGEON GENERAL 76 (1999), available at https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/; 
see also Ronald C. Kessler, et al., Prevalence, Severity, and Comorbidity of Twelve-Month 
DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R), 62 ARCHIVES 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 617, 619 (2005), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 
PMC2847357/ (placing the 12-month prevalence of mood disorders, including substance-
related, at 26.2% and noting that nearly one quarter of such cases were classified as 
“serious,” indicating a suicide attempt, work disability, or other substantial limitation).  
 2. INST. FOR HEALTH METRICS AND EVALUATION, UNIV. OF WASH., THE STATE OF U.S. 
HEALTH:  INNOVATIONS, INSIGHTS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE GLOBAL BURDEN OF 
DISEASE STUDY 54–64 (2013), available at http://www.healthmetricsand 
evaluation.org/gbd/publications/policy-reports.  The GBD study created a single measure—
disability-adjusted life years (DALYs)—to account for years of healthy life lost, either 
through death or disability.  Id. at 5.  The category of mental and behavioral disorders 
excludes neurological disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease, but includes psychological 
disorders such as schizophrenia and depression, as well as drug use disorders.  Id. at 58–59.  
 3. See STEPHEN J. SEDENSKY III, REPORT OF THE STATE’S ATTORNEY FOR THE 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DANBURY ON THE SHOOTINGS AT SANDY HOOK ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 
AND 36 YOGANANDA STREET, NEWTOWN, CONNECTICUT ON DECEMBER 14, 2012 1, 34 (2013) 
(reporting on the investigation of the mass shooting that resulted in 27 homicides and noting 
that the shooter had been diagnosed with Asperger’s Disorder, and suffered from significant 
social impairments and extreme anxiety);  VA Sheds Light on Mental Health of Navy Yard 
Gunman Aaron Alexis, CBSNEWS.COM (Sept. 18, 2013, 4:41 PM), 
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congressional attention on the issue of improving the Nation’s mental 
health care system, leading President Obama to propose mental health 
reform as part of a larger strategy to reduce gun violence.
4
  The President’s 
principal domestic achievement, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA),
5
 together with the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity 
Act of 2008 (MHPAEA),
6
 promise to improve access to, and the 
affordability of, mental health care.  The ACA mandates that insurers 
provide coverage of mental health and substance abuse disorder services in 
health plans,
7
 and the MHPAEA requires most private group health 
insurance plans that offer mental health benefits to offer those services in 
parity with medical/surgical benefits.
8
  Unfortunately, however, these 
reforms only apply in the context of health insurance and thus leave a 
significant regulatory gap by failing to address mental health parity in the 
related—but distinct—field of disability insurance. 
Disability insurance differs from health insurance in that benefits are 
payable only if the beneficiary becomes unable to work for an extended 
period of time due to illness or injury.
9
  Unlike health insurance, which pays 
                                                                                                     
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/va-sheds-light-on-mental-health-of-navy-yard-gunman-aaron-
alexis/ (reporting that in the month leading up to the shootings, Alexis reported hearing 
voices and claimed that people were sending microwave vibrations into his body to deprive 
him of sleep). 
 4. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NOW IS THE TIME:  THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN TO PROTECT 
OUR CHILDREN AND OUR COMMUNITIES BY REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE 13–15 (2013), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/preventing-gun-violence#what-we-can-do 
(proposing the creation of programs to identify and treat mental illness in students, training 
for teachers and mental-health professionals, and continued federal oversight of Medicaid 
mental health parity standards). 
 5. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 2713, 124 Stat. 119, 131 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
 6. Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act 
of 2008 (“MHPAEA”), Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 511–12, 122 Stat. 3881 (2008) (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 9812, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a, & 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5).  
 7. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(E) (2012) (listing “mental health and substances use 
disorder services, including behavioral health treatment” among the “essential health 
benefits” that must be covered in non-grandfathered health plans offered by insurers in the 
individual and small group markets). 
 8. 26 U.S.C. § 54.9812–1(b)(1) (2012).  The MHPAEA’s parity requirement does 
not, however, apply to firms with less than 50 employees or when application of the 
requirement would increase the overall cost of coverage by 2% in the first year the 
requirement is applied, or 1% in any year thereafter.  Id. at § 54.9812–1(f), (g).   
 9. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT 
PROGRAMS 346–48 (6th ed. 2009) (explaining that in contrast to health insurance, which 
covers medical care costs, disability income insurance replaces a portion of a disabled 
worker’s lost income).  Short-term disability insurance typically provides coverage for 26 
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the cost of medical treatment, disability benefits are designed to replace the 
beneficiary’s lost earning capacity.
10
  Because benefits are tied to earnings, 
the beneficiary’s payment amount reflects a percentage of her pre-disability 
income rather than the severity of disability suffered.
11
  Roughly one third 
of American workers receive disability insurance from their employer,
12
 
and employers that offer such plans typically pay 100% of the premiums.
13
   
The income lost due to a long-term disability can be financially 
devastating, and while many individuals benefit from the protection against 
loss of earning power that these plans afford, long-term disability insurers 
often provide significantly less coverage for mental health disabilities than 
for physical disabilities, generally through benefit caps and explicit 
limitations on coverage for mental disabilities.
14
  A common example of 
this practice is a twenty-four month cap on disability benefits for mental 
health conditions, including those stemming from alcohol or drug abuse.
15
  
By contrast, the typical practice in cases of physical impairment is to pay 
benefits from the onset of disability until the beneficiary reaches age 65 and 
becomes eligible for Medicare and Social Security benefits.
16
  Similar 
                                                                                                     
weeks, but in most cases is subject to a waiting period of at least one week.  Id. at 346.  
Long-term disability coverage generally begins when short term coverage ends.  Id. at 347. 
 10. Id. at 348. 
 11. See id. (noting that typically, long-term disability plans cover between 60 and 70 
percent of a person’s pre-disability monthly pay). 
 12. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BLS BULL. NO. 2776, NATIONAL 
COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 2013, table 16 
(2013), http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits 
/2013/printing.htm (finding that 33% of civilian workers—i.e. non-federal employees—
received access to long-term disability insurance through their employer while 37% had 
access to short-term disability insurance).  
 13. See id. at table 23, 28 (noting that 82% of short-term disability plans and 90% of 
long-term disability plans offered by employers do not require employee contribution).  
 14. See Nicole Martinson, Inequality Between Disabilities: The Different Treatment of 
Mental Versus Physical Disabilities in Long-Term Disability Benefit Plans, 50 BAYLOR  L. 
REV. 361, 362 (1998) (noting that benefits for mental disabilities are often capped at 18 or 24 
months, and that some disability plans allow for re-employment of persons with physical 
disorders if they later become medically able to work, an opportunity unavailable to persons 
with mental disorders).  
 15. See e.g., Legal Notices, Life and Disability Insurance Plans/Policies Exclusions 
and Limitations , AETNA.COM, http://www.aetna.com/legal-notices.html (last visited Feb. 8, 
2015) (placing a limit on benefits for mental health disabilities at 24 months absent a 
showing of “demonstrable, structural brain damage” or confinement as an inpatient in a 
hospital or other treatment facility).  
 16. See Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1008 (1997), cert. denied, 522 
U.S. 1084 (1998) (determining that Title III of the ADA did not prohibit employer’s plan 
offering 24 months of disability benefits for mental disorders and benefits up to age 65 for 
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inequitable practices in the field of health insurance are now limited under 
the MHPAEA and final rules implementing that Act,
17
 but the MHPAEA 




Despite recent changes in federal law addressing some of the more 
egregious discrimination against mental illness in health insurance, there 
has been no comparable progress toward achieving parity in disability 
benefits.  Meanwhile, potential state disability insurance reforms continue 
to be stymied by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), which preempts most state regulation of employee benefits.
19
  
What might seem the most obvious place to look for relief under federal 
law—the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which bans disability-
based discrimination in the workplace—has been interpreted by many 
courts to exclude claims of discrimination against insurers based on reduced 
coverage for mental as opposed to physical disabilities in employee 
disability benefit plans.
20
  Finally, while most working Americans may 
qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), which provides 
federal coverage for workers suffering from mental disabilities, SSDI is less 
generous than most private disability plans,
21
 employs a very strict 
                                                                                                     
physical disorders). 
 17. See Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity 
and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68, 240 (Nov. 13, 2013) (codified at 26 
C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pts. 146–47); see also 26 C.F.R. § 54.9812–
1(b)–(c) (requiring parity in aggregate lifetime and annual dollar limits, financial 
requirements, and treatment limitations between medical/surgical and mental health benefits 
within specified benefits classifications, including prescription drugs, and inpatient, 
outpatient, and emergency care). 
 18. See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9812–1(e)(1) (2014) (stating that mental health parity 
requirements apply to “group health plan[s] offering medical/surgical benefits and mental 
health or substance use disorder benefits”) (emphasis added). 
 19. ERISA and its preemptive provisions are discussed in detail infra Part III.C. 
 20. The provisions of the ADA that apply to disability benefits plans are explained 
further infra Part III.B. 
 21. See David Autor et al., Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability 
Insurance 3, 6–7, Fig.1, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18172, 2012), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18172 (explaining that the SSDI after-tax income 
replacement rate is lower than for most private long term disability plans, and that the 
maximum allowable monthly benefit of most private policies is substantially higher than in 
the SSDI program, an important factor for higher-income workers).  For 2012, the average 
monthly benefit paid to disabled workers was $1,049.56.  OFFICE OF RESEARCH, 
EVALUATION, AND STATISTICS, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE 
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 97 (2012). 
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definition of disability, and includes certain limitations that are not present 
in private disability insurance policies.
22
 
This Note examines current efforts to achieve mental health parity in 
the field of employer-offered long-term group disability insurance, 
ultimately concluding that in focusing on parity in health insurance, 
existing federal law has almost entirely overlooked a significant source of 
discrimination in the related field of employee disability benefits.  This 
oversight may result in part from the ongoing national debate over changes 
to health insurance under the ACA, which has created a kind of “fog of 
war,” shielding other important insurance benefits from the public’s view.  
This note will attempt to lift some of that fog.  Part II provides some 
necessary background on the discrimination and stigmatization faced by 
individuals suffering from mental impairments, and considers some of the 
primary arguments for and against parity.  Part III surveys existing federal 
law, noting the difficulties faced by employees bringing claims under the 
ADA and the significant limitations imposed by ERISA on employee 
benefits litigation.  Part IV examines a recent split between the First and 
Fourth Circuits on the contentious issue of whether the risk of relapse into 
drug addiction can constitute a current disability under an ERISA-
administered long-term disability plan.  Although this circuit split arose 
over a relatively narrow question, the legal and ethical principles relied on 
by the courts to decide the issue effectively represent the two sides in the 
broader debate over mental health parity, thus offering important insight for 
advocates of parity in disability benefits.  
II. Why Do We Need Parity in Disability Benefits? 
A. Containing Costs—The Argument Against Parity 
The principal argument against parity in disability insurance focuses 
on the need for cost containment to guarantee broad access to insurance.
23
  
                                                                                                     
 22. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2000) (defining disability as “inability to engage in 
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any . . . physical or mental impairment which 
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 
continuous period of not less than 12 months”).  Individuals who apply for SSDI benefits 
must complete a five-month waiting period and will receive “insured status” only if they 
meet requirements based on previous work in employment covered by Social Security.  Id. 
§423(c).   
 23. Insurers contain costs in part through a process known as “risk classification,” 
which involves sorting insurance applicants by various factors, such as age or occupation, 
thought to correspond to risk.  See Baker, infra note 27 at 376–78 (“Eliminating particularly 
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Parity requirements, the argument goes, interfere with the insurer’s ability 
to classify and respond to risks, and may result in increased premiums or 
even cause employers to terminate benefit plans entirely.
24
  Cost 
containment strategies are generally designed to minimize the twin 
problems of “moral hazard”
25
 and “adverse selection.”
26
  Moral hazard 
refers to the tendency of insured individuals to make use of benefits that 
they would not have relied on if uninsured.
27
  In the context of disability 
benefits, the moral hazard problem arises whenever an employee does not 
try as hard to return to work following an illness or injury or claims 
disability benefits for a condition that would not have caused the employee 
to miss work in the absence of insurance.
28
  The moral hazard problem may 
be magnified in the context of mental disability, where the existence of an 
allegedly disabling illness can be more difficult to verify, creating a greater 
likelihood of false diagnoses and incorrect eligibility determinations.
29
   
Adverse selection, with respect to disability benefits, refers to the 
tendency of individuals who believe they are more likely to become sick or 
injured to self-select into generous disability insurance policies while those 
who perceive their risk to be low “avoid or drop out” of voluntary 
employee insurance pools.
30
  Because mental and addictive disorders can be 
                                                                                                     
risky applicants reduces the average cost of insuring the members of the pool, allowing the 
insurer to offer a lower price and, possibly, obtain a greater profit.”).   
 24. See Brief for The Am. Council of Life Ins. & Health Ins. Ass’n of Am. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees, Rogers v. Dept. of Health and Envtl. Control, 
174 F.3d 431 (1999) (No. 97-2780) (predicting the “pernicious consequences” of mandating 
parity, including over-utilization, abuse, and “astronomical costs” that could make 
“employers and individuals unable to afford disability coverage at all”). 
 25. See Richard G. Frank et al., The Politics and Economics of Mental Health Parity, 
16 HEALTH AFF. 108, 110 (1997) (defining moral hazard as “the tendency for people to 
demand more services as the price they pay for the service falls”).  
 26. See id. at 111 (explaining that adverse selection can occur “when potential 
enrollees differ in their risks [and] paid premiums . . . do not fully reflect those 
differences . . .”). 
 27.  See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk 
Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 373 (2003) (referring to moral hazard as the “change in 
incentives that can result from insurance protection”). 
 28.  See Autor et al., supra note 21, at 27 (explaining that a moral hazard problem 
exists in disability benefits policies because of the difficulty of verifying disability, coupled 
with the relatively high income replacement rates in many disability plans). 
 29.  See Sheldon Danziger et al., Mental Illness, Work, and Income Support Programs, 
166 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 398, 400 (2009) (explaining that claims for disability insurance 
create a greater potential for “false positive eligibility errors” because determining disability 
due to mental disorders requires “professional judgment rather than formulaic assessments”). 
 30. See Baker, supra note 27, at 375–76 (explaining adverse selection and strategies 
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more persistent—and thus more costly over time—than other types of 
illnesses, insurers view individuals suffering from such ailments as “bad 
risks.”
31
  Insurers thus have an incentive to provide limited coverage for 
mental disabilities to both avoid attracting these bad risks and to minimize 
the higher costs associated with mental disability claims.  Cost containment 
strategies based on coverage limitations can be very effective, as evidenced 
by studies showing that workers whose benefits are capped, or who face 
longer elimination periods (the time that must elapse between the disabled 
employee’s initial claim and the beginning of payments) are less likely to 
claim long term disability benefits.
32
  
B. The Economic and Social Benefits of Parity 
Cost containment arguments are not without force—after all, insurers 
must remain solvent if they are to provide benefits to anyone—and if the 
price of private disability benefit plans rises too high, some employees may 
be priced out of coverage altogether.  Nevertheless, there are strong 
arguments for ending insurers’ ability to discriminate between mental and 
physical illness in disability policies.  First, mental illness limitations in 
disability plans are a symptom of the pervasive stigma associated with 
mental illness
33
 and ultimately rely on the common misperception that 
                                                                                                     
insurers use to limit its effect). 
 31.  See Frank et al., supra note 25, at 111 (“Since many mental and addictive 
disorders are more persistent than other illnesses, health plans have an incentive to reduce 
the likelihood that they will be chosen by persons with mental illness, who are generally 
‘bad risks’”).  Though offered in the context of health insurance, this reasoning also applies 
to disability insurance, where insurers have similarly strong incentives to limit the likelihood 
that they will be forced to pay benefits for lifelong (but seldom life-threatening) mental 
illnesses such as schizophrenia, leading many insurers to place a 24-month cap on disability 
benefits for mental illnesses. See, e.g., Nelson v. Standard Ins. Co., No. 13cv188–WQH–
MDD, 2013 WL 3776936, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 17, 2013) (upholding insurer’s 24-month cap 
on mental disability benefits under California insurance parity statute).  
 32. See Autor et al., supra note 21, at 3–4 (finding that higher income replacement 
rates and shorter waiting times significantly increased the likelihood that workers claimed 
disability benefits, revealing the impact of moral hazard on long term disability claims).  
 33. See S. Clement, et al., What is the Impact of Mental Health-Related Stigma on 
Help-Seeking? A Systematic Review of Quantitative and Qualitative Studies, 45 PSYCHOL. 
MED. 1, 11 (2014), available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/display 
Abstract?fromPage=online&aid=9452499&fileId=S0033291714000129 (reporting that 
stigma ranked fourth out of ten barriers to help-seeking by those suffering from mental 
illness, and was reported as a barrier by over one quarter of those surveyed).  The effects of 
stigma are more significant within certain groups, including males, and those in the military 
and health professions.  Id. at 7, 14.  
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mental illness is a fringe problem suffered only by an unfortunate few.
34
  
Public understanding of, and attitudes toward, mental illness has evolved 
from the days when a diagnosis often led to institutionalization in an 
asylum.
35
  Nevertheless, the stigma associated with mental illness has not 
fully dissipated, despite greater public awareness of the neurobiological 
causes of common mental disorders.
36
  Though severe mental illness by 
itself has been shown not to predict future violent behavior,
37
 national 
surveys reveal that many continue to associate mental illness with 
violence.
38
  The stigma felt by those suffering from mental illness may 
cause them to “hide their symptoms” or delay seeking treatment.
39
  
Untreated mental illness in turn imposes severe social and economic costs 
                                                                                                     
 34. See Wayne Edward Ramage, The Pariah Patient: The Lack of Funding for Mental 
Health Care, 45 VAND. L. REV. 951, 972–73 (suggesting that the “stigma associated with 
mental illness discourages many people from giving consideration to the possibility that they 
eventually may suffer from mental illness,” leading to pervasive undervaluation of mental 
health care); see also Ronald C. Kessler et al., Lifetime Prevalence and Age-of-Onset 
Distributions of DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication, 62 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 593, 596 (2005), available at http://archpsyc.jamanetwork.com/ 
article.aspx?articleid= 208678 (finding that nearly half of Americans will meet the criteria 
for a mental health disorder at some point during their lifetime).  
 35. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF 
THE SURGEON GENERAL 6 (1999) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT], 
https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/ (noting that rapid urbanization in the early 
19th century encouraged creation of isolated asylums for the mentally ill, a social policy 
later abandoned during the deinstitutionalization movement of the 1950s). 
 36. See Bernice A. Pescosolido et al., “A Disease Like Any Other”? A Decade of 
Change in Public Reactions to Schizophrenia, Depression, and Alcohol Dependence, 167 
AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1321, 1325 (finding “no reduction” in the stigma surrounding mental 
illness, despite wide public acceptance of neurobiological theories and support for treatment, 
including psychiatry); see also NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, THE SCIENCE OF MENTAL ILLNESS 21 
(2005), available at http://science.education.nih.gov/supplements/nih5/Mental/guide/nih_ 
mental_curr-supp.pdf (explaining that mental illness is associated with “changes in the 
brain’s structure, chemistry, and function”). 
 37. See Eric B. Elbogen & Sally C. Johnson, The Intricate Link Between Violence and 
Mental Disorder, 66 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 152, 152 (2009), available at 
http://archpsyc.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=210191 (finding that the incidence 
of violence in individuals suffering from severe mental illness was significantly higher only 
for those with co-occurring substance abuse issues).  
 38. See SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 35, at 7 (citing a 1997 study 
concluding that people with mental illnesses were perceived to be more violent than in 
similar research conducted in the past). 
 39. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, ATTITUDES TOWARD MENTAL 
ILLNESS: RESULTS FROM THE BEHAVIORAL RISK FACTOR SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM 4 (2012),  
http://www.cdc.gov/hrqol/mental_health_reports/mental_health_reports.html. 
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on society.
40
  By placing mental and physical disabilities on equal footing, 
parity laws help to reduce the damaging effects of stigma.  
More fundamentally, research into the causes of mental illness has 
discovered a biological basis for disorders such as schizophrenia and 
clinical depression, blurring the line between physical and mental 
impairment and calling into question the validity of the mental/physical 
distinction found in many disability insurance policies.
41
  Studies linking 
mental and physical illnesses suggest that improving overall mental health 
may help to ameliorate common physical ailments such as heart disease, 
providing further evidence of the social utility of parity laws.
42
   
The benefits of parity legislation, moreover, are not limited to 
improvements in health.  Nearly two-thirds of all consumer bankruptcies 
are directly related to illness or medical debt.
43
 The proportion of 
bankruptcies attributable to medical causes rose by 49% between 2001 and 
2007.
44
  Perhaps surprisingly, most (77.9%) of those who identified illness 
as a contributing factor in their bankruptcy were insured at the onset of 
                                                                                                     
 40. See UNIV. OF TEX. MENTAL HEALTH POLICY ANALYSIS COLLABORATIVE, THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF UNTREATED MENTAL ILLNESS IN HOUSTON, 3 (2009), 
http://www.mhtransformation.org/documents/reports/external/The%20Consequences% 
20of%20Untreated%20Mental%20Illness%20In%20Houston.pdf (explaining that the 
societal costs of Houston’s underfunded mental health infrastructure include “economic loss, 
homelessness, increased juvenile and adult criminal justice system involvement, and about a 
25-year decrease in life expectancy”). 
 41. See, e.g., Elain Walker & Kevin Tessner, Schizophrenia, 3 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 30, 30 (2008) (“[G]radually, over the past half century, the functional-organic 
distinction has been abandoned, giving way to the idea that schizophrenia is a brain 
disorder.”).  Recent research on schizophrenia’s causes suggests that the disease is heritable, 
and is associated with specific genes as well as physical changes in the brain’s composition 
and structure.  Id. at 32, 34–35; see also R.H. Belmaker & Galila Agam, Major Depressive 
Disorder, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 55, 58–59 (2008) (describing the “considerable evidence” 
linking physical abnormalities such as elevated cortisol levels with depression and noting 
that antidepressant treatment resulted in reversal of some of these abnormalities).  
 42. See Belmaker & Agam, supra note 41, at 64 (pointing to “[s]trong epidemiologic 
data” linking major depressive disorder with “increased cardiovascular morbidity and 
mortality”).  High cortisol levels from depression may increase the risk of coronary artery 
disease, and antidepressants have been shown to increase the survival rate of patients who 
become depressed following a heart attack.  Id.   
 43. See David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: 
Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 743 (2009), available at 
http://www.pnhp.org/new_bankruptcy_study/Bankruptcy-2009.pdf (finding that 62.1% of 
debtors in bankruptcy reported medical causes, with 37.8% blaming income lost due to 
illness). 
 44. Id. at 744. 
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illness, with over 60% receiving private insurance coverage.
45
  A 2008 
study of home foreclosures similarly found that nearly half of homeowners 
on the brink of foreclosure cited medical issues, including lost work arising 
from a medical problem, as a major contributor to their mortgage defaults.
46
  
Clearly, in many cases health insurance is not enough to protect against the 
financial devastation of an unexpected illness or injury.  
Private long-term disability insurance can provide a much-needed 
financial buffer or “safety net” for individuals who cannot afford to go 
without income due to a severe illness or injury.
47
  Some commentators 
have gone as far as to suggest compulsory disability insurance as a solution 
to the medical bankruptcy problem.
48
  There is no reason the crucial safety 
net of private disability insurance should be limited to disabled workers 
suffering from physical ailments.  The public safety nets that may be 
available, such as SSDI benefits, are likely to replace only a small fraction 
of an individual’s former income and may not be enough to prevent 
bankruptcy or foreclosure.
49
  In 2012, for example, the average monthly 
SSDI benefit was $1,049.56.
50
  Employees rely on private disability benefit 
plans to ensure that an unexpected illness does not result in financial 
                                                                                                     
 45. Id.  
 46. See Christopher Tarver Robertson et al., Get Sick, Get Out: The Medical Causes of 
Home Mortgage Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 68 (2008) (reporting that 49% of 
respondents indicated foreclosure due to a medical problem, with 27% pointing specifically 
to lost work stemming from a medical problem). 
 47. See Alena Allen, State-Mandated Disability Insurance as Salve to the Consumer 
Bankruptcy Imbroglio, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1327, 1336–38 (2011) (noting that “most 
Americans simply are not able to maintain a personal rate of savings that would allow them 
to survive a loss of income caused by a medical crisis.”). 
 48. See id. at 1358–70 (arguing for state-mandated short term disability insurance as a 
way of reducing per-capita bankruptcy rates in states that do not already have such laws).  
 49. Unemployed individuals waiting for SSDI benefits may receive state public 
assistance income, but the monthly amount of such income is set below the federal poverty 
level.  See Cathryn Miller-Wilson, Becoming Poor: Stories of the Real “Safety Net” and the 
Consequences for Middle America, 13 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1, 9 (2009).  Presumptive 
SSI benefits may also be available while the disabled individual waits for an SSDI 
determination, but end after a period of six months even if there has been no determination 
of permanent disability.  See 20 C.F.R. § 416.931 (2010).  For 2014, the Presumptive SSI 
amount was $721 per month for individuals. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 2014 Social Security 
Changes, http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colafacts2014.html (last visited Feb. 8, 
2015). 
 50. SOC. SEC. ADMIN, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 97 (2012), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/ 
docs/statcomps/di_asr/2012/index.html. 
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disaster; mental illness limitations undermine the value of the employee’s 
entitlement in a way that may go unnoticed until it is too late.
51
  
III. Previous Attempts at Achieving Parity in Disability Insurance Benefits 
A. First Attempt: The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
Congress’ first attempt at addressing disability-based discrimination 
came with passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
52
 which prohibits 
discrimination
53
 by federal agencies and private entities contracting with the 
federal government or receiving federal financial assistance.
54
  Though the 
Act’s protections extend to persons with mental disabilities,
55
 they apply in 
somewhat haphazard fashion: state and local governments that receive 
federal aid are subject to the Act, while identical entities without federal 
funding are exempt from the law’s mandates.
56
  Perhaps more importantly 
                                                                                                     
 51. Plans that include the common 24-month limitation on mental disability benefits 
discriminate against employees who in the future will become disabled due to mental, rather 
than physical conditions because, as one court explained it, future mentally disabled 
employees’ “present dollars (unbeknownst to them) are buying only 24 months of benefits, 
instead of benefits lasting much longer.”  E.E.O.C. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 
(7th Cir.1996). 
 52. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); 29 
U.S.C. § 794 (2002). 
 53. Under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, discrimination may be proved by 
evidence of “disparate impact,” but the “adverse impact” theory of discrimination is 
unavailable.  See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 (1985) (assuming, without 
deciding, that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act barred some conduct having an 
“unjustifiable disparate impact” on the handicapped); S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 27 (1989) 
(explaining that under the ADA, employers may continue to offer insurance policies with 
pre-existing conditions exclusions, even if such exclusions “adversely affect” people with 
disabilities).  The Senate report emphasized that the ADA incorporated the disparate impact 
standard and the Supreme Court’s analysis of that standard from Alexander to “ensure that 
the legislative mandate to end discrimination does not ring hollow.”  Id. at 28.  
 54. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2002) (prohibiting discrimination by “any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by 
any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service”).   
 55. See id. (protecting “qualified individual[s]” with a disability, defined by § 705(20) 
as including mental impairments, but excluding persons currently engaging in illegal drug 
use).   
 56. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 at 37 (describing the potential for “inconsistent 
treatment” of people with disabilities by different state or local agencies as “inequitable and 
illogical for a society committed to full access for people with disabilities”). Subsequent 
judicial decisions have further limited the law’s applicability in certain contexts.  See, e.g., 
Joren v. Napolitano, 633 F.3d 1144, 1146 (7th Cir. 2011) (denying plaintiff’s claim of 
disability discrimination and joining other circuit courts in holding that the Aviation and 
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for those seeking parity in disability benefits, the law was enacted primarily 
to encourage vocational rehabilitation of the handicapped and not to remedy 
discrimination against persons unable to work.
57
  Moreover, advocates of 
mental health parity have lamented the “indeterminate language” of the 
Act’s key provisions, which many felt represented a “wholesale refusal” to 
confront disability discrimination head-on.
58
  Congress explicitly responded 
to these concerns by enacting stronger legislation in the form of the ADA.
59
 
B. Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
1. History and Purpose 
The ADA was enacted in 1990 as a comprehensive piece of civil rights 
legislation, broadening and entrenching the reforms of the Rehabilitation 
Act.
60
  Like the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA prohibits discrimination 
against mental as well as physical disorders, defining disability as “a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major 
life activities.”
61
  This definition of disability is identical to the one used 
                                                                                                     
Transportation Security Act preempted application of the Rehabilitation Act to airport 
security screeners).  
 57. See 29 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1998) (stating the Act’s purpose to “empower individuals 
to maximize employment” and “ensure that the Federal Government plays a leadership role 
in promoting the employment of individuals with disabilities . . .”); 119 Cong. Rec. 24, 571 
(1973) (declaring the proposed bill’s intent to “place more emphasis on rehabilitating 
individuals with more severe handicaps”). 
 58. Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARV. L. REV. 997, 999 (1984); 
see also Julie Brandfield, Undue Hardship: Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 59 
FORDHAM L. REV. 113, 114–116 (1990) (lamenting the Act’s failure to achieve “as 
substantial an effect on the lives of the handicapped as was hoped” and attributing this 
failure to section 504’s “general prohibitions” that lacked “details or definitions”). 
 59. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2009) (finding that discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities “continue[s] to be a serious and pervasive social problem” and that 
individuals experiencing such discrimination “have often had no legal recourse”); S. Rep. 
No. 101-116 at 17 (1989) (explaining that current federal law was “inadequate” because it 
provided no protection against discrimination by private employers, places of public 
accommodation, or State and local agencies that did not receive federal aid). 
 60. See H. Rep. No. 101-485 at 26 (“The [ADA] completes the circle . . . with respect 
to persons with disabilities by extending to them the same civil rights protections provided to 
women and minorities beginning in 1964. The ADA is a comprehensive piece of civil rights 
legislation which promises a new future: a future of inclusion and integration . . . .”). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2009);  see also 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(h)(2) (2012) 
(clarifying that “physical or mental impairment,” as defined in the Act, includes “any mental 
or psychological disorder, such as an intellectual disability . . . organic brain syndrome, 
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under the Rehabilitation Act.
62
  Title I of the ADA, however, discards the 
Rehabilitation Act’s “federal funding” requirement and extends protection 
against discrimination based on disability to all “terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment” (including fringe benefits such as disability 
policies), and both public and private employees.
63
 
2. Disabled Former Employees as “Qualified Individuals” Under Title I 
The ADA was intended to “level the playing field”
64
 for persons with 
disabilities; however, plaintiff’s attorneys relying on the ADA have 
generally had little success in challenging common mental illness 
limitations in long-term disability policies.
65
  This is due in large part to the 
fact that Title I’s protections apply only to “qualified individual[s] with a 
disability,” defined as those who, “with or without reasonable 
accommodation,” are able to perform the “essential functions” of a given 
employment position.
66
  The Act’s legislative history makes clear that the 
definition of “qualified individual” was intended to allow employers the 
freedom to retain only individuals capable of performing the relevant job 
tasks.
67
  Thus, the fact of disability itself is not enough to guarantee 
                                                                                                     
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities”). 
 62. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B). 
 63. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (prohibiting employment discrimination by “covered 
entities,” defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) as an “employer, employment agency, labor 
organization, or joint labor-management committee”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) 
(prohibiting discrimination in fringe benefits); see also H. Rep. No. 101-485 pt. 2 at 84 
(1990) (noting that section 202 of the ADA extends the Rehabilitation Act’s 
nondiscrimination policy to cover “all State and local governmental entities”). 
 64.  See Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(claiming that in enacting the ADA Congress sought to “‘level the playing field’ for the 
disabled by discouraging employment decisions based on “unfounded stereotypes”). 
 65. Contrary to popular perception, employers win the vast majority of Title I cases.  
See Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 
22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 404 (1998) (reviewing 1,248 Title I 
employment cases and finding that of the 760 cases in which a final decision was rendered, 
employers won 92% of the time). 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2009). 
 67. See S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 24 (1989) (“By including the phrase ‘qualified 
individual with a disability,’ the Committee intends to reaffirm that this legislation does not 
undermine the employer’s ability to choose and maintain qualified workers.”).  The Senate 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources further explained that in determining the 
“essential functions” of a job, consideration should be given to the employer’s judgment 
regarding what functions qualified as essential as a matter of “business necessity.”  Id.  
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protection under the ADA.
68
  Read literally, Title I offers little protection to 
totally disabled former employees challenging discrimination by insurers—
the scenario in which most claims of discrimination in long term disability 
benefits arise. 
Courts have noted the apparent incongruity between the ADA’s 
restrictive definition of “qualified individual” and the otherwise broad 
requirement of nondiscrimination in employee disability benefits.
69
  Title 
I’s definition of “qualified individual” has forced those challenging mental 
illness limitations in disability policies to make the logically incoherent 
argument that they are totally disabled, yet capable of performing the 
“essential functions” of their job.
70
  Employers and insurers have focused 
on this definition to argue that totally disabled former employees are not 
entitled to protection under the ADA because they do not currently hold an 
“employment position” and thus are unable to perform the “essential 
functions” of their job with or without reasonable accommodation.
71
  Four 
out of the six circuits that have considered the issue have agreed.
72
   
                                                                                                     
 68. See Michelle Parikh, Burning the Candle at Both Ends, and There is Nothing Left 
for Proof: The Americans with Disabilities Act’s Disservice to Persons with Mental Illness, 
89 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 729 (2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)) (“[A]n individual who 
seeks protection under the ADA must necessarily conquer two hurdles before claiming 
entitlement: first, the individual must meet the definition of disability, and second, the 
individual must be qualified to perform the functions of the position.”).  
 69. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 605 (3d Cir. 1998) (remarking 
on the “internal contradiction” and disjunction between the ADA’s definition of “qualified 
individual with a disability” and the other rights conferred by the ADA).  
 70. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2009); E.E.O.C. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 
(7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting mentally-disabled former employee’s claim of discrimination in 
long-term disability policy as not “cognizable” under Title I because she had no current 
“employment position”).  
 71. The Second and Third Circuits have rejected this defense.  See Ford v. Schering-
Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 606–7 (3d Cir. 1998) (relying on analogous Supreme Court 
precedent interpreting the scope of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to hold that the 
ADA permits suits by disabled individuals against former employers); see also Castellano v. 
City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting “textual ambiguity” surrounding 
the time at which an employee must have been a “qualified individual” and holding that 
former employees were “qualified individuals” under the ADA so long as they had 
performed the essential functions of their job for a period sufficient to establish entitlement 
to benefits).  
 72. The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have accepted the defense.  See 
McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 550 F.3d 519, 528 (6th Cir. 2008); Morgan v. Joint 
Admin. Bd. Retirement Plan of Pillsbury Co., 268 F.3d 456, 457 (7th Cir. 2001); Weyer v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000); Gonzales v. Garner 
Food Services, Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1525–26 (11th Cir. 1996), overruled by Johnson v. K 
Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2001).  Johnson was subsequently vacated upon 
rehearing en banc, leaving Gonzales as the final word in the Eleventh Circuit. See Johnson v. 
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In several of these cases, the Equal Opportunity Employment 
Commission (EEOC) argued to no avail that the term “employment 
position” in the ADA should be interpreted to include the position of post-
employment “benefit recipient,” thus sweeping former employees into the 
ADA’s definition of “qualified individual.”
73
  The few favorable rulings on 
this issue have focused instead on Congress’ “broad remedial purpose” of 
ending disability discrimination in all aspects of employment, reasoning 
that the “essential functions” requirement does not apply to former 




Other courts considering challenges to caps on mental disability 
benefits plans have held that an insurance policy’s distinction between 
mental and physical disabilities does not itself constitute discrimination 
under the terms of the ADA.
75
  According to this line of reasoning, a 
disability policy is nondiscriminatory, regardless of its terms, if it is offered 
to all employees without respect to the employees’ disability status.
76
  The 
ADA thus prohibits discrimination between the disabled and non-disabled 




                                                                                                     
K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2001), reh’g granted, vacated 273 F.3d 1035 (11th 
Cir. 2001).  
 73. See, e.g., Brief for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Appellant, at 7–13, Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1015 (6th Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1084 (1998) (“[W]hen an individual with a disability seeks 
access to a post-employment benefit allegedly denied or limited because of her disability, the 
relevant inquiry is not whether she is qualified to perform the essential functions of a 
particular job, but whether she is qualified to receive the benefit sought.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 67–68 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“Where the alleged discrimination relates to the provision of post-employment benefits, 
rather than to hiring, promotion, or firing, Congress's expressed concern about qualifications 
is no longer implicated.”). 
 75. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 1998) (“While the 
defendants’ insurance plan differentiated between types of disabilities, this is a far cry from 
a specific disabled employee facing differential treatment due to her disability.”). 
 76. See id. (“So long as every employee is offered the same plan regardless of that 
employee's contemporary or future disability status, then no discrimination has occurred 
even if the plan offers different coverage for various disabilities.”). 
 77. See Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1015 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 522 U.S. 1084 (1998)  (holding that the ADA “does not mandate equality between 
individuals with different disabilities”);  E.E.O.C. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (denying claim that plan’s disparate treatment of mental disability benefits was 
discriminatory because to do otherwise would “read into” the ADA a rule currently subject 
to “vigorous, sometimes contentious, national debate”). 
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Congress addressed concerns that courts had incorrectly narrowed the 
scope of the ADA’s protections with passage of the ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008 (ADAAA).
78
  The ADAAA expressly overturned four Supreme 
Court decisions, most notably Sutton v. United Air Lines, Incorporated,
79
 in 
which the Court had determined that “whether an impairment substantially 
limits a major life activity” was to be ascertained “with reference to the 
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures.”
80
  Though decided in the 
context of physical impairment, the Court’s discussion of mitigating 
measures also threatened to adversely impact disability claims brought by 
those with severe mental illnesses that are treated with medication.
81
  Many 
lower courts relied on the Court’s reasoning and held that individuals with 
mental illnesses that could be controlled though the use of medication did 
not have a disability that “substantially limits one or more major life 
activities”
82
 as required by the ADA.
83
  The ADAAA reaffirmed Congress’ 
intent that courts focus primarily on the employer’s compliance with ADA 
regulations rather than on whether an individual’s impairment constituted a 
disability, a question that “should not demand extensive analysis.”
84
  
Nevertheless, ADA litigation outcomes confirm that even after passage of 
the 2008 Amendments, the ADA’s definition of “qualified individual” 
remains a substantial hurdle to plaintiffs with mental disabilities.
85
 
                                                                                                     
 78. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2)–(5), 122 Stat. 
3553, 3554 (asserting that holdings in several Supreme Court cases had “narrowed the broad 
scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating protection for 
many individuals whom Congress intended to protect”).  
 79. 527 U.S. 471 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. 
L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (holding that severely myopic job applicants who were 
denied positions as commercial airline pilots because they did not meet the employer’s 
uncorrected visual acuity standards were not disabled within the meaning of the ADA due to 
the availability of corrective or mitigating measures). 
 80. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(2) (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, 
Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999)). 
 81. See Randal I. Goldstein, Mental Illness in the Workplace After Sutton v. United 
Air Lines, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 929 (2001) (explaining that Sutton threatened to make 
the ADA “largely unworkable” for some mentally ill plaintiffs). 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2009). 
 83. See, e.g., Swanson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 268 F.3d 307, 316 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(finding individual suffering from depression was “impaired” but not “substantially limited” 
because his symptoms improved with medication).  
 84. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008m§ 2(b)(5). 
 85. See Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under The 
ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2055 (2013) (finding that post-
amendment, employers won summary judgment on the qualified individual issue in 69.7% 
of cases, as opposed to 47.9% pre-amendment).  Employers’ success rate in summary 
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3. Section 501(c) and Insurer “Subterfuge” 
ADA Section 501(c), left unchanged by the ADAAA, creates a “safe 
harbor” provision that on its face permits insurers to discriminate in the 
terms of employee benefit plans.
86
  This so-called “bona fide” benefit plan 
exemption clarifies that the ADA does not prohibit insurers or employers 
from “establishing . . . or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan 
that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such 
risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law.”
87
  Insurers and 
self-insured employers thus appear free to discriminate between mental and 
physical disabilities in disability benefit plans if such discrimination is part 
of a risk classification strategy.   
The Act also provides, however, that employee benefit plans may not 
be used as a “subterfuge” to evade the ADA’s purposes.
88
  To help resolve 
the apparent conflict between these two provisions, the EEOC issued 
guidance in 1993 stating that insurance distinctions based on disability 
might violate the ADA, and suggesting several ways to prove that a 
challenged disability-based distinction is not subterfuge, including by 
showing that the disparate treatment is “attributable to the application of 
legitimate risk classification and underwriting.”
89
  Reviewing courts faced 
with challenges to disparate treatment of mental and physical disabilities in 
long term disability insurance policies have neatly sidestepped these 
guidelines by finding that the EEOC’s interpretation, because it addresses 
                                                                                                     
judgment decisions on the qualified individual issue involving only plaintiffs with mental 
impairments rose from 60% to 66.7%, though this finding is based on a small sample of 
post-amendment rulings. Id. at 2056. 
 86. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2009).  Section 501(c) states: “Titles I through IV of 
this Act . . . shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict . . . a person or organization . . . 
from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit 
plan that is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance.”  As discussed infra Part III.C.2, 
ERISA’s preemption provisions exempt self-funded employee benefit plans from state laws 
regulating insurance, meaning that all such plans are covered by section 501(c)(3).  
 87. Id. § 12201(c)(2).  
 88. Id. § 12201(c)(3).  
 89. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 TO DISABILITY-BASED DISTINCTIONS IN 
EMPLOYER PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE (1993); see also Ruth Colker, The Americans with 
Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 158 (1999) 
(observing that Congress “filled the legislative history with clear and consistent statements 
that it intended the term ‘subterfuge’ to require insurance companies to base their disability-
based distinctions on sound actuarial principles”). 
A FAILURE TO REHABILITATE 489 
health as opposed to disability benefits, has no application to long term 
disability benefit programs.
90
   
One of the first cases to consider whether differences in coverage 
between mental and physical health benefits could trigger the “subterfuge” 
exception to the ADA’s safe harbor provision was Modderno v. King.
91
  In 
Modderno, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a benefit plan’s 
$75,000 lifetime maximum for mental health benefits did not violate 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or constitute “subterfuge” under the 
ADA.
92
  The court relied in large part on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts,
93
 which had previously 
interpreted the same term in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA),
94
 holding that structuring a plan to provide reduced benefits for 
mental disabilities was not a discriminatory “subterfuge” so long as the plan 
was not a method of discriminating in some “other, non-fringe-benefit 
aspects of the employment relationship.”
95
  While the court noted that 
Congress had subsequently amended the ADEA to overturn the Betts 
decision,
96
 it reasoned that this congressional response strengthened its 
argument: Betts remained controlling precedent when the ADA was 
enacted, yet Congress still chose to adopt the “subterfuge” language of 
section 501(c).
97
   
                                                                                                     
 90. See E.E.O.C. v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 
Interim Guidance states at the outset that it addresses only health insurance  . . . We cannot 
place great reliance on an informal guidance that . . . does not apply to the question at 
hand.”).  
 91. See Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that an 
insurance plan’s reduced lifetime maximum for mental health benefits was not a 
“subterfuge” to avoid ADA requirements). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 180 (1989) (interpreting former 
§ 4(f)(2) of the ADEA to exempt employee benefit plans from the Act’s coverage except 
when such plans were used as a subterfuge for age discrimination in other, non-benefit 
aspects of the employment relationship), superseded by statute, Older Workers Benefit 
Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978, as recognized in Meacham v. 
Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 94 (2008). 
 94. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2008).  
 95. Betts, 492 U.S. at 177.  
 96. See Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1064–65 (noting that after Betts, Congress removed the 
“subterfuge” language from the ADEA entirely and reflecting that this response 
“presumably” indicated Congress’s opinion that “‘subterfuge,’ as understood by the Court, 
was not a suitable way to accomplish the congressional purpose in the context of the 
ADEA”).  
 97. See id. at 1065 (“[W]hen Congress chose the term ‘subterfuge’ for the insurance 
safe-harbor of the ADA, it was on full alert as to what the Court understood the word to 
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There is some reason to doubt Congress’ intention to incorporate Betts 
into the ADA’s definition of “subterfuge,”
98
 but the fact remains that 
501(c)’s subterfuge provision has proved ineffectual as a means of 
challenging insurer discrimination in employer-offered disability benefits.
99
 
More broadly, the reason behind the unsuccessful outcome of many 
challenges may be that claims brought by totally disabled former employees 
suffering from mental disabilities seek to redress a type of discrimination 
that was simply not envisioned by Congress when enacting the ADA.
100
 
The prototypical Title I case involves a claim by an employee that she was 
terminated despite her ability to “perform the essential functions” of her job 
with or without reasonable accommodation.
101
 By contrast, claims of 
discrimination in long-term disability benefits are by definition brought by 
individuals unable to perform essential work functions.  Claims alleging 
discrimination based on mental impairment in the terms of employee 
disability insurance thus do not fit neatly within the ADA’s regulatory 
structure.  Indeed, mental disabilities—although not quite an afterthought—
                                                                                                     
mean and possessed (obviously) a full grasp of the linguistic devices available to avoid that 
meaning.”). 
 98. See 136 Cong. Rec. H4624 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Edwards). 
Explaining that: 
The term “subterfuge” is used in the ADA simply to denote a means of evading 
the purposes of the ADA. It does not mean that there must be some malicious 
intent on the part of the insurance company or other organization, nor does it 
mean that a plan is automatically shielded because it was put into place before 
the ADA was passed. Indeed, there is currently a bill moving through Congress 
to overturn the Betts decision and we have no intention of repeating a decision 
with which we do not agree. 
 99. Appellate courts that have considered “subterfuge” claims have uniformly rejected 
the EEOC’s interpretation and instead adopted the Supreme Court’s narrow reading of the 
term in Betts. See Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1996); See generally 
Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 36 (2d Cir. 1999); Ford v. Schering-Plough 
Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 611 (3d Cir. 1998); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 
679 (8th Cir. 1996); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1116–17 
(9th Cir. 2000). The same courts have declined to require insurers to justify their coverage 
plans through actuarial data demonstrating that the plans are not a “subterfuge,” under the 
theory that this would place courts in the position of “super-actuary.”  See, e.g., Ford, 145 
F.3d at 612.  
 100. See Iwata v. Intel Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 135, 150–51 (D. Mass. 2004) (noting that 
despite evidence in ADA’s legislative history suggesting that Congress considered and 
rejected certain prohibitions on differential coverage in health insurance, Congress “fail[ed] 
to discuss the ADA’s application to welfare benefit plans . . .”). 
 101. See id. at 146 (asserting that disputes over an employee’s ability to perform the 
essential functions of a job with reasonable accommodation are the “most common” form of 
claim under the ADA).   
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C. Restrictions to State Reform Under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 
1. Introduction  
In addition to regulation under the ADA, employer-offered long-term 
disability benefits plans are subject to extensive federal regulation under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
103
  While 
Congress originally enacted ERISA to rectify the problem of 
mismanagement in private pension funds,
104
 ERISA regulation also extends 
to employer-offered “welfare benefit” plans, defined broadly as plans 
“maintained for the purpose of providing . . . medical, surgical, or hospital 
care benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death 
or unemployment . . . .”
105
  Although Congress has generally allowed states 
to serve as the primary regulators of most types of insurance,
106
 ERISA 
                                                                                                     
 102. See Goldstein, supra note 81, at 942 n.123 (explaining that a survey of the ADA’s 
legislative history reveals that experts who testified before Congress primarily addressed 
physical disabilities and that none of the hypothetical “reasonable accommodations” 
mentioned in the House Report address mental disabilities).  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 101-
485 pt. 2 at 33–34 (1990) (mentioning only accommodations for physical disabilities such as 
deafness or cerebral palsy).  
 103. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–406, 
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (2012)). 
Government plans and most church plans, however, are exempt from ERISA regulation. 
ERISA §4(b); 29 U.S.C. §1003(b). ERISA similarly does not extend to individually 
purchased health or disability plans and other benefit plans not provided by employers, such 
as uninsured motorist insurance and worker’s compensation policies.  Id. 
 104. See S. REP. NO. 93-127 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4838 
(declaring ERISA’s purpose to “prescribe legislative remedies for the various deficiencies 
existing in the private pension plan systems”); H.R. Rep. NO. 93-807, at 13 (1973), reprinted 
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4680 (recounting the widely-publicized 1964 closing of the 
Studebaker plant, which resulted in termination of an underfunded pension benefit plan and 
nonpayment of benefits to large numbers of employees, many of whom had vested rights).  
 105. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2008). 
 106. The Supreme Court held that “[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of 
commerce,” and thus that states were free to regulate the business of insurance. Paul v. 
Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868), overruled by United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 
322 U.S. 533 (1944).  The Court later overturned its decision in Paul, which led Congress in 
1945 to enact the McCarran-Ferguson Act, reaffirming Congress’ belief that continued state 
regulation of the business of insurance is “in the public interest.”  15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012).   
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represents a significant departure from this general rule by federalizing the 
regulation of employee insurance benefits.  It is important to understand 
ERISA’s effect on employee benefits because most disability insurance 
plans in the United States are provided by employers,
107
 and many 
employers rely on provisions in ERISA to avoid state-mandated benefits, 
including state mental health parity laws.
108
  Meanwhile, ERISA itself does 
not require that employers provide particular benefits or prohibit 
discrimination between mental and physical impairments.
109
 
Despite preempting many traditional state remedies, such as tort 
liability for bad faith breaches of insurance contracts,
110
 the remedial 
scheme ERISA offers in return is intentionally limited and provides little to 
replace the state laws it supersedes.
111
  For example, many courts have held 
that beneficiaries are not entitled to jury trials when seeking to recover 
benefits due under the terms of their employee disability plan,
112
 and 
                                                                                                     
 107. See David J. Christianson, Disability Income Insurance: The Private Market and 
the Impact of Genetic Testing, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 40, 44 (2007) (noting that employer-
offered group disability insurance policies cover roughly 30 percent of the labor force, while 
only 3.3 percent of workers are covered by individually-purchased long term disability 
plans).  
 108. See infra notes 122–126 and accompanying text (explaining employers’ ability to 
self-insure as a means of avoiding state regulation).  
 109. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983) (“ERISA does not 
mandate that employers provide any particular benefits, and does not itself proscribe 
discrimination in the provision of employee benefits.”); Wilson v. Globe Specialty Prods, 
Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 92, 97 (D. Mass. 2000) (dismissing ERISA beneficiary’s claim 
alleging disparate treatment of mental and physical disability benefits and emphasizing that 
“ERISA does not require . . . equal benefits for different disabilities.”). 
 110. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987) (concluding that ERISA 
preempted Mississippi common law claim for insurer’s bad faith breach of insurance 
contract based on improper claims processing); Barber v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 383 F.3d 134, 
140 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding state statute was conflict preempted under 502(a) because it 
allowed the plan participant to recover punitive damages for bad faith conduct by insurer).  
 111. See discussion of ERISA remedies infra Part III.C.3. 
 112. ERISA does not specifically address the right to jury trial, and courts have 
uniformly held that beneficiaries suing under § 502(a)(3) for “other appropriate equitable 
relief” are not entitled to jury trial due to the equitable nature of the cause of action.  See, 
e.g., Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 393 (3d Cir. 1988) (“In using the words 
‘equitable relief’, we can infer that Congress knew the significance of the term equitable and 
intended that no jury be available on demand.”).  Courts are divided on whether a 
beneficiary relying on § 502(a)(1)(B) to recover “benefits due” under the terms of the plan is 
entitled to a jury trial.  Compare Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council No. 43, 431 F. 
Supp. 745, 747 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (finding that 502(a)(1)(B) created an action for legal 
relief, triable to a jury upon demand), with Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 
589 F.3d 1345, 1355 (10th Cir. 2009) (concluding that 502(a)(1)(B) did not create a right to 
jury trial because the “threshold question” was equitable in nature, requiring determination 
A FAILURE TO REHABILITATE 493 
ERISA does not permit compensatory damages, removing a crucial check 
on unprincipled claims handling in ERISA disability plans.
113
  ERISA’s 
exclusive regulatory scheme was intended to bring uniformity to the field of 
employee pension and welfare benefits law, with the aim of lowering the 
cost to employers of providing such benefits.
114
  Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting ERISA, however, have narrowed the statute’s already narrow 
range of remedies, leading Justice White to remark on the “anomaly” of 
interpreting ERISA so as to “leave those Congress set out to 
protect . . . with ‘less protection than they enjoyed before ERISA was 
enacted.’”
115
   
2. ERISA Preemption 
                                                                                                     
of plaintiff’s entitlement to assets held in trust by defendant).  
 113. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (finding 
“nothing at all” in the regulations or the statute to support recovery of extra-contractual 
damages, compensatory or punitive relief).  After Russell, individuals wrongfully denied 
benefits under an ERISA plan were generally limited to recovering “benefits due” under the 
plan terms according to ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).  Id. at 214.  This encouraged abuse because 
insurers found to have wrongfully accepted premiums or denied coverage would at most be 
forced to repay ill-gotten gains or pay benefits due.  See McCravy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
690 F.3d 176, 182–83 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that absent “remedies beyond mere premium 
refunds” ERISA plan fiduciaries had “every incentive to wrongfully accept premiums” even 
if they knew that no coverage existed).  See also Thomas P. Kelly III, A Call for the 
Overhaul of ERISA: How the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 Rewards 
Employers for Bad Faith Denials of Legitimate Claims for Employee Disability Benefits, A 
Multi-Case Study Involving One Philadelphia-Based Insurance Carrier, 37 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 283, 302 (2013) (opining that “it makes good business sense for companies . . . to 
intentionally and knowingly violate ERISA because there is no penalty for doing so beyond 
a possible award of attorney fees.”). 
 114. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 388 (2002) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“[E]xclusivity of remedies is necessary to further Congress’ interest in 
establishing a uniform federal law of employee benefits so that employers are encouraged to 
provide benefits to their employees . . . .”). 
 115. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 267 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989)); see also John H. 
Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in 
Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1336–37 (2003) (arguing that a 
series of Supreme Court decisions misinterpreted ERISA’s remedial provisions, incorrectly 
excluding equitable forms of relief such as consequential damages); Nancy Lee Firak, 
Threshold Barriers to Title I and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act: 
Discrimination Against Mental Illness in Long-Term Disability Benefits, 12 J.L & HEALTH 
205, 219 (1998) (“Many commentators believe that ERISA, which was intended to be a pro-
employee measure, has become a tool through which employers have successfully limited 
employees’ access to courts and to meaningful remedies . . . .”). 
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Perhaps the most damaging feature of ERISA, at least with respect to 
mentally disabled claimants challenging discriminatory terms in employee 
disability insurance policies, are ERISA’s comprehensive preemption 
provisions.  ERISA preemption comes in three varieties.  First, express 
preemption under section 514(a), as noted above, provides that ERISA 
“supersede[s] any and all State laws [that] relate to any employee benefit 
plan . . . .”
116
  The broad sweep of this clause is then curtailed by the 
“savings” clause exception of section 514(b)(2)(A), which exempts some 
state laws from preemption, including those that regulate insurance.
117
  
Finally, the “savings” clause itself is subject to an exception in the form of 
the section 514(b)(2)(B) “deemer” clause, which provides that no employee 
benefit plan may be “deemed” to be an insurance company under any state 
law purporting to regulate insurance.
118
  
State laws that are saved from section 514(a) preemption may still be 
subject to “implied” preemption under ERISA’s 502(a) civil enforcement 
provisions.  The Supreme Court has held that this section constitutes a 
“complete preemption” exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, 
permitting removal to federal court of any cause of action within the scope 
of section 502(a).
119
 Section 502(a) also serves a second preemptive 
function by providing exclusive federal remedies that preclude plaintiffs 
from asserting any state-law cause of action that “duplicates, supplements, 
or supplants” the remedies available under section 502(a).
120
  
Despite a handful of more recent Supreme Court decisions that 
somewhat limit the reach of ERISA preemption,
121
 the statute still 
                                                                                                     
 116. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).  
 117. Id. at § 1144(b)(2)(A). 
 118. Id. at § 1144(b)(2)(B). 
 119. See Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004) (stating that ERISA’s 
civil enforcement mechanism has “such ‘extraordinary preemptive power’” that it converts a 
state common-law complaint into a federal claim under the well-pleaded complaint rule) 
(quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65–66 (1987)). 
 120. Id. at 201.  
 121. The Supreme Court defined the limits of ERISA preemption in N.Y. State 
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).  
Prior to Travelers, the Court had interpreted ERISA § 514(a) to preempt any state law that 
had a “connection with or reference to” an employee benefit plan.  Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1983).  Recognizing the near-boundless reach of this 
interpretation, the Court relied on what it considered ERISA’s objectives—namely, 
“eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee 
benefit plans”—to conclude that ERISA preemption did not extend to state laws that only 
indirectly influenced the cost of covered benefits.  Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657 (quoting 
remarks of Senator Williams, 120 Cong. Rec. 29933 (1974)).  The modest trend in favor of 
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effectively shields many long-term disability plans from both state 
regulation and tort claims.  As interpreted by the Supreme Court, section 
514(b)(2)(B)’s deemer clause exempts self-funded ERISA plans from state 
laws “regulating insurance” within the meaning of the savings clause.
122
  
State laws “directed toward” such plans are thus preempted because they 
“relate to” the employee benefit plan, but are not “saved” because the state 
law is not held to be a law regulating insurance.
123
 Increasingly both large 
and small employers rely on the deemer clause to self-insure, taking on the 
burden of funding and administering the plan in return for near-total 
exemption from state regulation, including benefit mandates.
124
  Employers 
themselves are liable for employee benefit claims made under a self-insured 
plan, but courts have almost uniformly held that employers do not lose self-
insured status by purchasing separate stop-loss insurance policies to 
mitigate their risk, further encouraging the shift to self-insurance.
125
  Sixty-
one percent of employees insured through ERISA plans are covered by 
partially or completely self-funded plans, a figure that has steadily 
                                                                                                     
according states greater authority to regulate insurers continued with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003), which held 
that state laws are exempt from ERISA preemption if they are “directed toward entities 
engaged in insurance” and “substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between the 
insurer and insured.”  Id. at 342; see also Matthew O. Gatewood, The New Map: The 
Supreme Court’s New Guide to Curing Thirty Years of Confusion in ERISA Savings Clause 
Analysis, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 643, 674–76 (2005) (arguing that the Miller test “bolsters 
the Insurance Savings Clause”). 
 122. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (holding that ERISA’s deemer 
clause preempted application of Pennsylvania anti-subrogation law to self-funded health 
benefit plan). 
 123. Id.; see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (“[O]ur 
decision results in a distinction between insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former 
open to indirect regulation while the latter are not. By so doing we merely give life to a 
distinction created by Congress in the ‘deemer clause’. . . .”).   
 124. See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2013 ANNUAL 
SURVEY 1, 178 (2013) [hereinafter KAISER SURVEY], available at https:// 
kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/8465-employer-health-benefits-20132.pdf 
(finding that in 2013, 94% of large firms—defined as those with 5,000 or more workers—
chose to self insure). 
 125. See e.g., Am. Med. Sec. Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 524 U.S. 936 (1998) (“[P]lans that are self-funded or self-insured may not 
themselves be regulated as insurance companies [under the “savings clause”] even if the 
self-funded or self-insured plan purchases stop-loss insurance to cover losses or benefits 
payments beyond a specified level.”); Pariseau v. Albany Int’l Corp., 822 F. Supp. 843, 846 
n.5 (D. Mass. 1993) (lamenting the shift to self-insurance that “significantly reduced the 
class of workers for whom the benefits of state insurance regulation [were] available”).  
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increased over time.
126
 Thus, while state laws may be more protective of 
mental health disability benefits than federal legislation, the scope of 
ERISA preemption and the prevalence of self-insured plans means that such 
laws affect only a fraction of the employees receiving disability benefits.   
3. ERISA Limits the Remedies Available to Disabled Employees Wrongfully 
Denied Benefits 
For many mentally disabled employees with employer-provided long-
term disability policies, ERISA preemption of state common law remedies 
may be even more troubling than preemption of state statutory protections. 
The remedies available under ERISA section 502(a) are very limited, and 
generally track those available under the law of trusts.
127
  ERISA’s primary 
remedial provision, section 502(a)(1)(B), permits a participant or 
beneficiary to bring a civil action “to recover benefits due” under the terms 
of the plan.
128
  Section 502(a)(2) authorizes a beneficiary to invoke liability 
for breach of fiduciary duty, but any recovery in such cases inures to the 
benefit of the plan rather than to the beneficiary directly.
129
  Finally, section 
502(a)(3) authorizes injunctive relief against practices that violate ERISA 
fiduciary law or the terms of a plan, as well as suits to obtain “other 
appropriate equitable relief . . . to redress such violations.”
130
  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Aetna Health Incorporated v. Davila
131
 reaffirmed the 
exclusivity of these remedial provisions, finding that the Congressional 
purpose of creating a “comprehensive statute for the regulation of employee 
benefit plans” demands preemption of any state remedy that “duplicates, 
                                                                                                     
 126. See KAISER SURVEY, supra note 124 at 176–78 (finding that across all firms, the 
percentage of covered workers in partially or completely self-funded plans rose from 44% to 
61% from 1999 to 2013). 
 127. See Langbein, supra note 115, at 1333–34 (claiming that ERISA “absorbs” trust 
law’s three-part remedial system, which allows “recovery for loss, restitution of profits, and 
recovery of foregone gains”). 
 128. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2009). 
 129. See id. at § 1109(a) (“Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who 
breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this 
subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan 
resulting from each such breach . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 130. Id. at § 1132(a)(3) (2009). 
 131. See Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004) (holding that ERISA 
§ 502(a)(1)(B) prevents individuals from bringing any claim—either state or federal—that 
the individual “could have brought” under § 502(a)(1)(B)).  
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supplements, or supplants” ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme.
132
  As 
mentioned above,
133
 preemption of traditional state-law remedies leaves 
disabled former employees with few options when seeking to redress bad 
faith denials by insurers. 
For many years the Supreme Court further narrowed the range of 
remedies available to ERISA beneficiaries by construing section 502(a)(3) 
to include only those categories of relief that were “typically available in 
equity” before the merger of law and equity.
134
  Thus both punitive 
damages and make-whole remedies such as compensatory damages were 
not available because such forms of relief were primarily legal in nature.
135
  
The Supreme Court’s decision in CIGNA Corporation v. Amara
136
 signaled 
a modest shift toward expanding the scope of allowable equitable remedies 
under section 502(a)(3).
137
  Legal remedies remain unavailable, but Justice 
Breyer’s majority opinion described three potential bases of equitable 
relief: reformation, estoppel, and surcharge.
138
  While this portion of the 
opinion is arguably dictum,
139
 some Circuit Court opinions have relied on 
Breyer’s discussion “almost as firmly” as an outright holding.
140
   
The Fourth Circuit cited Amara in reversing a decision it had issued 
the same day Amara was decided, finding on rehearing that equitable 
                                                                                                     
 132. Id. at 208–9. 
 133. See supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
narrow interpretation of the already narrow range of remedies provided by ERISA). 
 134. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) (listing injunction, 
mandamus, and restitution among the remedies typically available in equity, but excluding 
compensatory damages).  
 135. See id. at 255 (“Money damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief.”). 
 136. See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1877 (2010) (holding that 
disclosures contained in statutorily-required summary plan document could not be enforced 
under section 502(a)(1)(B) as the terms of the plan itself). 
 137. See id. at 1880 ([T]he fact that . . . relief takes the form of a money payment does 
not remove it from the category of traditionally equitable relief.”). 
 138. Id. at 1879–80. 
 139. Id. at 1884 (“The Court's discussion of the relief available under § 502(a)(3) and 
Mertens is purely dicta, binding upon neither us nor the District Court.”). But see Susan 
Harthill, The Supreme Court Fills a Gaping Hole: Cigna Corp. v. Amara Clarifies the Scope 
of Equitable Relief Under ERISA, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 767, 791 (2012) (claiming that 
the majority’s discussion of estoppel, reformation, and surcharge in Amara was not dicta 
because it was “fully debated” and was an essential part of the Court’s grant of certiorari and 
oral argument). 
 140. See McCravy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 176, 181 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing 
Gaylor v. U.S., 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996) for the proposition that courts are “bound 
by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings, particularly 
when the dicta is recent and not enfeebled by later statements”). 
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remedies of estoppel and surcharge were potentially available to the 
plaintiff.
141
  The court received the Amara decision with evident relief, 
noting that the existing “stifled” state of the law interpreting section 
502(a)(3) encouraged abuse by fiduciaries.
142
  Even after Amara, however, 
ERISA’s remedial scheme leaves aggrieved beneficiaries in the unenviable 
position of either shoehorning their request for relief into one of the 
statute’s defined remedial categories (i.e. filing suit under section 
502(a)(1)(B) for “benefits due”) or seeking “appropriate equitable relief” 
under ERISA’s 502(a)(3) “catch-all” provision, the exact outlines of which 
may vary according to circuit precedent.
143
 
The Fourth Circuit was not alone in welcoming Amara’s clarification 
of the scope of equitable remedies under ERISA.
144
  The Supreme Court’s 
use of the law-equity distinction to support excluding money damages had 
been sharply criticized,
145
 and the lack of consequential damages, coupled 
with ERISA’s broad preemptive power, created what was aptly termed a 
“regulatory vacuum,”
146
 or more viscerally, a “gaping wound.”
147
  Yet, 
Amara has not resulted in a sea-change in ERISA remedies law. The 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in U.S. Airways, Incorporated v. 
McCutchen
148
 reiterated ERISA’s “principal function” of protecting 
contractually-defined benefits, citing pre-Amara case law for the 
proposition that section 502(a)(3) does not authorize equitable relief “‘at 
                                                                                                     
 141. Id. at 181–82. 
 142. See id. at 183 (noting that with its decision in Amara, the Supreme Court put to 
rest many of the “perverse incentives” created by interpreting ERISA’s remedial provisions 
to exclude many forms of equitable relief).  
 143. See Harthill, supra note 139, at 789 (directing plaintiffs to thoroughly research the 
parameters of equitable relief under existing circuit jurisprudence, including looking for 
bases of relief beyond the three mentioned in Amara). 
 144. See Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 489 F.3d 590, 593–94 (2007) (collecting judicial and 
scholarly authorities in favor of revising ERISA’s remedial regime and urging either 
Congress or the Supreme Court to “reconsider” the availability of make-whole relief under 
502(a)(3)). 
 145. See Langbein, supra note 115, at 1352–53 (arguing that monetary damages were 
historically available under both law and equity, and that there was “no basis either in the 
text of ERISA or in its legislative history” for excluding money damages from the relief 
Congress intended to make available under 502(a)(3)).  
 146. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 147. Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J., dissenting in part), 
vacated, 124 S. Ct. 2902 (2004).  
 148. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1542–43 (2013) (holding that 
in a suit under section 502(a)(3), equitable defenses cannot override the unambiguous terms 
of an ERISA plan’s reimbursement provision). 
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large’” but instead “countenances only such relief as will enforce ‘the terms 
of the plan’ or the statute.”
149
  Amara is therefore in accord with the Court’s 
oft-repeated assertion that ERISA’s restrictive civil enforcement provisions 
represent a “careful balancing” by Congress of the need for “prompt and 
fair” settlement procedures against the public’s general interest in 
“encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans.”
150
  This careful 
balancing often tilts away from providing effective relief for injured 
beneficiaries. 
4. Judicial Deference to Plan Administrators 
A further obstacle that disabled beneficiaries must confront when 
alleging improper benefit denials or other fiduciary misconduct is the 
deferential standard of judicial review that applies in most ERISA cases.  
ERISA beneficiaries whose claims for disability benefits are denied must 
first exhaust a plan’s internal review procedures, after which they may enter 
an external review process or pursue a claim in federal court for benefits 
due under § 502(a)(1)(B).
151
  ERISA itself is silent on the crucial issue of 
how much deference a reviewing court should give to the eligibility 
determinations of ERISA plan administrators, a category that includes both 
insurers and self-insured employers.
152
  The degree of deference to be 
afforded the plan administrator is nevertheless of extreme importance 
because, as Judge Posner has noted, the broader that discretion, “the less 
solid an entitlement the employee has, and the more important it may be to 
him . . . to supplement his ERISA plan with other forms of insurance.”
153
  
                                                                                                     
 149. Id. (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 253 (1993)). 
 150. Davila, 542 U.S. at 208 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 42 
(1987)).  
 151. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); see also Sawyer v. USAA Ins. Co., 912 F. Supp. 2d 
1118, 1150 (2012) (holding ERISA beneficiary’s claim barred for failure to follow grievance 
procedures provided by her policy).  Exhaustion of remedies is a judicial requirement, rather 
than an express provision of ERISA.  McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 137 F.3d 
1253, 1263 (1998). 
 152. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989) (“ERISA 
does not set out the appropriate standard of review for actions under § 1132(a)(1)(B) 
challenging benefit eligibility determinations.”). 
 153. .  Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 2000).  The 
court further explained that the “very existence of ‘rights’ under such plans depends on the 
degree of discretion lodged in the administrator.”  Id.  Interestingly, the court went on to 
suggest its own “safe harbor” language: “Benefits under this plan will be paid only if the 
plan administrator decides in his discretion that the applicant is entitled to them.”  Id. 
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The Supreme Court first addressed this question in Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Company v. Bruch.
154
  The Court held that the default standard of 
review for ERISA plan decisions was de novo, but nevertheless reasoned 
that if the terms of the benefit plan granted the administrator discretionary 
authority to construe the terms of the plan, courts should engage in a more 
deferential form of review.
155
  If a plan administrator or fiduciary was found 
to be operating under a possible or actual conflict of interest, this conflict 
should be weighed as a factor in determining whether there was an abuse of 
discretion.
156
 The Court’s subsequent decision in Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company v. Glenn
157
 clarified that an administrator engaged in 
the common “dual role” of both evaluating and paying benefits claims 
necessarily created the kind of conflict of interest referred to in Firestone.
158
  
The plan administrator’s conflict in this situation arises from the fact that 
“every dollar saved by the administrator on behalf of his employer is a 
dollar in [the employer’s] pocket.
159
  Nevertheless, the presence of this 
conflict did not itself dictate a change in the standard of review from 
deferential to de novo.
160
  
Not surprisingly, following Firestone discretionary clauses in plan 
documents became the norm, rather than the exception.
161
  Application of 
what is essentially an arbitrary or capricious standard of review is highly 
beneficial to defendants.
162
  For example, under this deferential standard, a 
                                                                                                     
 154. See Firestone Tire, 489 U.S. at 115 (holding that the denial of benefits under 
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) is reviewable under a de novo standard unless the plan document 
grants the administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. (“Of course, if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or 
fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a 
‘facto[r] in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion’”) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959)). 
 157. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 112, 115 (2008) (finding that 
where an employer or insurance company both funds a plan and determines eligibility for 
benefits, a conflict of interest exists that must be weighed when considering whether a plan 
administrator abused its discretion in denying benefits). 
 158. Id. at 108. 
 159. Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 144 (3d Cir. 1987), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
 160. See Metro. Life, 554 U.S. at 115 (“We do not believe that Firestone’s statement 
implies a change in the standard of review, say, from deferential to de novo review.”).  
 161. See John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident 
Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. L. REV. 1315, 1324 
(2007) (“Plan drafters routinely seize upon Bruch’s invitation to instruct the courts to defer 
to plan decision making. . . . [D]eferential review pervades the ERISA-plan world . . . .”).  
 162. For an example of the remarkable degree of deference afforded plan 
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plan administrator is not required to obtain an expert opinion, such as the 
opinion of the beneficiary’s treating physician, prior to denying benefits 
based on its interpretation of the plan documents.
163
  Courts may still apply 
the de novo standard of review where the plan administrator has failed to 
exercise any discretion, such as by ignoring or summarily rejecting requests 
for benefits.
164
  As a practical matter, however, most ERISA claims are 
evaluated by courts under a standard of review that is highly deferential to 
plan administrators.
165
  This deferential review standard places aggrieved 




IV. A Contemporary Example: The Circuit Split over Risk of Relapse into 
Addiction 
Only two circuit courts have ruled on the issue of whether the risk of 
relapse into addiction can constitute a current disability under an ERISA-
administered group long-term disability benefit policy.
167
  Though this 
particular issue tends to arise under distinct factual circumstances—
plaintiffs in cases addressing the issue are invariably anesthesiologists or 
nurse anesthetists who have become addicted to various types of pain 
                                                                                                     
administrators, see Fuller v. CBT Corp., 905 F.2d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1990), asserting that 
when the plan terms imbue the administrator with discretion to interpret the plan, an 
administrative determination can be overturned only where it is “not just clearly incorrect, 
but downright unreasonable.”  
 163. See Duhon v. Texaco, Inc., 15 F.3d 1302, 1309 (5th Cir. 1994) (declining to hold 
that plan administrator abused discretion in not consulting vocational rehabilitation expert 
where plan granted administrator discretionary authority to construe terms of plan). 
 164. See Gritzer v. CBS, Inc., 275 F.3d 291, 295–96 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding plan 
administrator’s denial of benefits subject to de novo review where administrator undertook 
no independent analysis of the claim and provided no written reasoning for the benefit denial 
until after onset of litigation). 
 165. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 384 (2002) (noting the 
deferential standard was a feature of judicial review “highly prized” by benefit plans). 
 166. See Maria O’Brian Hylton, Post-Firestone Skirmishes: The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Discretionary Clauses, and Judicial Review of ERISA Plan 
Administrator Decisions, 2 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 1, 1–2 (2010) (stating that after 
Firestone, even plaintiffs who “seem to have a strong claim to promised benefits” often find 
themselves unable to meet the “very high bar required for a finding of arbitrary and 
capricious behavior”). 
 167. The Fourth Circuit in Stanford v Cont. Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2008), and 
the First Circuit in Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co. & Mgmt. Co. for Merrimack Anesthesia 
Assocs. Long Term Disability Plan, 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013). 
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medication—several factors combine to allow meaningful generalizations 
from these cases to the broader context of mental disability benefits and 
efforts toward achieving parity.  First, there is significant uniformity in the 
terms of most disability insurance policies, particularly with respect to the 
provisions relevant here. Typical definitions of “total disability,” and the 
most common form of discrimination against those with mental 
disabilities—the twenty-four month cap on mental disability benefits—are 
essentially identical across most policies.  Second, because claiming 
disability based on the risk of relapse into substance abuse is perhaps the 
most controversial way an employee can seek to obtain disability benefits, 
these decisions provide a uniquely useful roadmap for any mentally 
disabled employee (or her attorney) on the border of qualifying for 
disability benefits.  Lastly, the circuit split provides an interesting 
opportunity to view two courts grappling with the larger policy issues at the 
heart of the parity debate, including problems of moral hazard and the 
public interest in rehabilitation of the mentally ill.  
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach 
1. The Majority Opinion 
On September 28, 2003, Robert Stanford left his position as a Certified 
Nurse Anesthetist (“CRNA”) at Beaufort Memorial Hospital in South 
Carolina and entered an inpatient substance abuse treatment program.
168
  In 
an alarmingly common scenario, Stanford had become addicted to 
Fentanyl, a powerful opiate administered by anesthetists during surgical 
procedures.
169
  Stanford completed a twenty-eight day addiction 
rehabilitation program, but relapsed within a week.
170
  He then entered a 
second, ninety-day treatment program, eventually returning to his original 
                                                                                                     
 168. Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Stanford v. 
Cont’l Cas. Co., 455 F. Supp. 2d 438 (E.D.N.C. 2006) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Brief].  
 169. Id; see also Ethan O. Bryson & Jeffrey H Silverstein, Addiction and Substance 
Abuse in Anesthesiology, 109(5) ANESTHESIOLOGY 905, 905–6 (2008) (noting the “drug of 
choice” for anesthesiologists entering treatment is typically an opioid and describing factors 
that may explain this result, including proximity to highly addictive drugs and the “relative 
ease of diverting . . . small quantities . . . for personal use”); Fentanyl: Incapacitating Agent, 
Emergency Response Safety and Health Database, CDC.GOV, http://www.cdc. 
gov/niosh/ershdb/EmergencyResponseCard_29750022.html (last updated Nov. 20, 2014) 
(explaining that Fentanyl is estimated to be 80 times as potent as morphine and hundreds of 
times more potent than heroin).  
 170. Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 168, at 3.  
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position at the hospital on March 12, 2004.
171
  Shortly after returning to 
work, however, Stanford experienced a second relapse and again left work 
to enter a third treatment center.
172
   
Continental Casualty Company insured and administered Beaufort 
Hospital’s employee benefits plans, and paid Stanford long term disability 
benefits for the duration of Stanford’s inpatient treatment program.
173
  
Continental nevertheless terminated Stanford’s disability benefits after 
Stanford had completed his third addiction treatment program,
174
 explaining 
its decision by asserting that Stanford was no longer “functionally 
impaired” from performing his regular job duties.
175
  In response to an 
administrative appeal letter submitted by Stanford, Continental asserted that 
although Stanford’s treatment providers indicated a potential risk of relapse 
if he returned to work, Stanford’s policy “[did] not cover potential risk.”
176
 
The Fourth Circuit ruled on Stanford’s challenge to the denial of his 
long-term disability benefits in Stanford v. Continental Casualty 
Company
177
 finding that Continental’s interpretation of its benefit plan as 
excluding the “potential risk” of relapse was reasonable.
178
  Stanford had 
presented two claims on appeal: first, that Continental applied an 
unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the plan language
179
 when it 
concluded that the plan did not cover the risk of relapse, and second, that 
Continental had violated ERISA internal review procedures by failing to 
                                                                                                     
 171. Id. at 3–4.  
 172. Id. at 4.  
 173. Id. at 3–4. 
 174. Id. at 5. 
 175. Id.  
 176. Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 168, at 6. 
 177. See Stanford v Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 361 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
insurer did not abuse its discretion under ERISA disability plan in denying benefits for risk 
of relapse into addiction), abrogated on other grounds by Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 
U.S. 105 (2008), as recognized in Champion v. Black & Decker Inc., 550 F.3d 353, 359 (4th 
Cir. 2008).  
 178. See id. at 358 (“We cannot say that Continental’s conclusion is unreasonable, even 
in light of Continental’s conflict of interest as insurer and administrator of the benefit 
plan . . . .”). 
 179. The relevant portion of Stanford’s policy provided that he would be considered 
“disabled” if “injury or sickness causes physical or mental impairment to such a degree of 
severity that you are 1) continuously unable to perform the material and substantial duties of 
your regular occupation; and 2) not gainfully employed.”  See Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 
168, at 8. 
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consult a health care professional when reviewing its initial denial of 
benefits.
180
   
As to Stanford’s first claim, the court noted that Continental “did not 
contest Stanford’s characterization of his addiction as a sickness,” and went 
on to accept Continental’s claim that Stanford “no longer suffered from 
physical or mental impairments.”
181
  Moreover, the court found 
unpersuasive several cases cited by Stanford in which physicians had been 
found disabled based on the risk of recurrence of a heart attack.
182
  A high-
stress operating room, the court emphasized, may “cause” a heart attack in a 
doctor with a preexisting heart condition, but an addict who enters an 
environment where drugs are readily available “risks relapse” only in the 
sense that the environment heightens his temptation.
183
  The majority noted 
that it was “not unsympathetic” to the argument that Continental’s policy 
created what it termed a “perverse-incentive structure:” the plan entitled 
Stanford to disability benefits if he continued to abuse drugs, but upon 
achieving sobriety he would lose those benefits unless he relapsed into 
addiction.
184
  Nevertheless, this argument relied on the “false assumption” 
that disability benefits operate as a “reward for sobriety.”
185
  
Stanford’s second claim relied on a Department of Labor regulation 
requiring insurers to “consult with a health care professional who has 
appropriate training and experience” when reviewing an adverse benefit 
determination based “in whole or in part on a medical judgment.”
186
  The 
Fourth Circuit agreed with Continental that Stanford’s claim did not 
necessarily implicate a matter of medical judgment because the insurer’s 
determination that “risk of relapse” did not fall within the plan’s definition 
of disability was “contractual, not medical.”
187
  Continental’s failure to 
                                                                                                     
 180. See Stanford, 514 F.3d at 357–58.  
 181. Id. at 358. 
 182. See id. at 358 (explaining that “the risk of a heart attack is different from the risk 
of relapse into drug use”). 
 183. See id. (“Whether he succumbs to that temptation remains his choice; the heart-
attack prone doctor has no such choice.”). 
 184. Id. at 359. 
 185. See id. (“Although this argument is not without force, it operates on a false 
assumption, namely that disability benefits are a sort of reward for sobriety. In fact, 
sobriety’s reward is the creation of innumerable opportunities that were closed to Stanford as 
long as he continued to use drugs.”). 
 186. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503–1(h)(3)(iii); Stanford v Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 360 
(4th Cir. 2008). 
 187. See Stanford, 514 F.3d at 360 (“Continental’s denial of benefits was based solely 
on its determination that such a risk of relapse did not fall within the benefit plan’s definition 
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consult a medical professional was thus immaterial; the plan’s discretionary 
clause gave Continental “sole discretionary authority” to interpret the 
provisions of its plan and Continental had no obligation to consult medical 
professionals in exercising this authority.
188
  “Put differently,” the majority 
reasoned, consultation with a health care professional would not have 
yielded information relevant to “the appropriate interpretation of the term 
‘disability’ in the benefit plan.”
189
   
2. Judge Wilkinson’s Dissenting Opinion in Stanford 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wilkinson chastised the Stanford 
majority for resting its decision on “abstractions” not grounded in law and 
employing its equitable power to “authorize an unwritten exception to 
Continental’s textual promise of coverage.”
190
  Importantly, Continental did 
not dispute that Stanford could not safely perform the duties of his regular 
occupation, a situation that could only arise from an existing rather than 
future impairment, “namely, Stanford’s fentanyl addiction.”
191
   
The plan’s “Exclusion’s and Limitations” section made no mention of 
“potential risk,” and in any case, Judge Wilkinson wrote, the phrase was a 
redundancy: “‘potential risk’ is just risk.”
192
  The plan’s stated definition of 
disability was functional, by its terms including any “injury or sickness 
caus[ing] physical or mental impairment . . . .”
193
  Moreover, Continental’s 
interpretation of the term “disability” was not in accord with the common 
understanding of that term in insurance law, which held simply that an 
insured was disabled “when the activity in question would aggravate a 
serious condition affecting the insured’s health.”
194
  ERISA, Judge 
Wilkinson reasoned, did not prevent a plan administrator from writing an 
exclusion into the plan for risk of relapse into addiction, but such an 
exclusion was “manifestly absent” in Stanford’s policy.
195
  The majority’s 
                                                                                                     
of ‘disability.’ This determination was contractual, not medical.”). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 361 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
 191. Id. at 362. 
 192. Id. at 361. 
 193. Stanford v Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 361 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J., 
dissenting). 
 194. See id. at 362–63 (quoting Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 146 F. Supp. 
2d 619, 628 (D.N.J. 2001)).  
 195. Id. at 363. 
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conclusion that Continental’s plan did not cover the risk of relapse thus 
seemed to rely on a fabricated dichotomy between “choice and temptation” 
on the one hand, and actual physical inability on the other.
196
  Stanford’s 
policy made no such distinction.
197
  
3. Critiquing Stanford 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that many long-term 
disability insurance policies, including Stanford’s, are “hybrid” policies 
containing two distinct periods of coverage, each with different 
requirements.
198
  During an initial “own occupation” period, typical plan 
terms provide that the insured may receive disability benefits if she is 
unable to perform the regular duties of her own occupation due to illness or 
injury.
199
  At the end of the own occupation period, which commonly lasts 
between twenty-four and thirty-six months, the insured will qualify for 
benefits only if she can show that she is unable to perform the regular duties 
of any occupation.
200
   
The Stanford majority emphasized its worry that it would be 
“perverse” should Stanford “go on to great success in another occupation 
but was still able to collect insurance checks on the basis of ‘disability.’”
201
  
But that possibility was already foreclosed by plan language providing that 
                                                                                                     
 196. Id. at 363 (“The majority’s opinion] appears to rest on moral considerations of 
choice and temptation on the one hand, and medical considerations of physical inability on 
the other, neither of which are to be found in the language of a Plan that puts addiction 
squarely on all fours with other impairments.”). 
 197. See id. (claiming that the language of the plan “puts addiction squarely on all fours 
with other impairments”). 
 198. 10A COUCH ON INSURANCE § 147:107 (3d ed. 2013) (“Some policies are of a 
hybrid occupational and general nature, providing benefits for a stated period of 
occupational disability and, thereafter, for general disability. . . .  [I]t is, therefore, error to 
interpret both as requiring that the insured be unable to perform the essential tasks of only 
his or her occupation.”).  
 199. See id. (noting that “inability to work at one’s usual occupation” does not require 
“total helplessness of the insured”).  An interesting example of insurer overreaching in this 
regard is Helms v. Monsanto Co. Inc., 728 F.2d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir. 1984), where the 
insurance company denied disability benefits on the basis that “total disability” could only 
be shown by the absence of “conscious human life”).  The insurer’s action was found to be 
arbitrary and capricious.  Id. at 1420. 
 200. See COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 198 (describing the “any occupation” 
standard as a “general disability” provision). 
 201. Stanford v Cont’l. Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 359–360 (4th Cir. 2008). 
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a claimant could not be disabled if “gainfully employed.”
202
  A much 
greater oversight was the court’s caution that “it is important to remember 
that Stanford is physically and mentally capable of performing . . . 
countless other jobs.”
203
  This statement not only rings hollow in Stanford’s 
particular case, given the years of specialized training necessary to become 
a nurse anesthetist, but ignores both the language of Continental’s disability 
plan and the substance of Stanford’s claim.  Stanford’s policy included the 
common twenty-four month “own occupation” period
204
 and conditioned 
payment of benefits after that period on proof that the employee was 
disabled from performing “any occupation” for which he could become 
qualified through “education, training, or experience.”
205
 
Stanford challenged Continental’s denial of benefits only for the initial 
twenty-four month period, and thus was only required to provide proof of 
his inability to perform the “material and substantial duties” of his “regular 
occupation.”
206
  Stanford’s ability to perform the material duties of another 
occupation thus had no bearing on his right to benefits under the terms of 
Continental’s disability policy—at least during the period in which the less 
stringent “own occupation” standard applied. The majority’s speculation 
about Stanford’s ability to perform the responsibilities of other jobs 
misunderstands the nature of the common “own occupation” standard in 
long-term disability policies and appears to create an additional hurdle that 
lacks any basis in the language of Stanford’s plan. 
More importantly for other employees in Stanford’s position, and 
indeed for all mentally disabled former employees seeking benefits under a 
disability insurance policy, the Stanford court placed great emphasis on 
what it viewed as a clear distinction between involuntary physical illnesses 
and the addict’s “choice” to relapse.
207
  A similar (and similarly misguided) 
                                                                                                     
 202. See Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 168, at 8–9. 
 203. Stanford, 514 F.3d at 359. 
 204. Id. Note that this “own occupation” period in Stanford’s policy is distinct from the 
familiar twenty-four month cap on mental disability benefits. See COUCH ON INSURANCE, 
supra note 198 (explaining the meaning of “usual” or “own occupation”). The “own 
occupation” standard creates a more lenient test for receipt of benefits during an initial 
period, while the twenty-four month cap operates as an absolute bar to mental disability 
benefits after the first twenty-four months. Id. Stanford’s policy, like most long-term 
disability policies, included both an “own occupation” period and a cap on mental disability 
benefits. See Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 168, at 3. In Stanford’s case, the two provisions 
happened to be coterminous. Id.  
 205. See Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 168, at 3. 
 206. Id. at 8. 
 207. See Stanford, 514 F.3d at 358 (whether [the addict] succumbs to . . . temptation 
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argument is often applied to mental illness more generally.
208
  The typical 
claim, like the one made by the Stanford court, is that mental illness, unlike 
physical ailments, is a matter of the will—a failure of individual self-
control rather than a disease that can be treated and cured.
209
   
The court’s characterization of relapse as a choice is not only 
misguided, but overlooks the purpose of disability benefits.  The strength of 
addiction, particularly to drugs as powerful as Fentanyl, is such that many 
addicts do not have a meaningful choice in whether they relapse: one study 
found that anesthesiologists who returned to their original practice after 
treatment for addiction relapsed at a rate over eight times higher than those 
who found other types of work.
210
  Moreover, presence or absence of choice 
does not provide a useful means of distinguishing between covered and 
non-covered illnesses in disability policies. Voluntary choice is equally a 
component of numerous physical ailments, such as heart disease and 
diabetes, in which individuals may choose (or not) to control the symptoms 
of their disease through diet, exercise, and proper medical treatment.
211
  The 
Stanford majority’s “choice” argument simply misses the point: the real 
question was whether Stanford could safely perform the duties of his 
position as a nurse anesthetist.  The answer in Stanford’s case was clearly 
no—his return to work posed a serious risk not only to his own health, but 
to the health of his potential patients.
212
  Given that there was never any 
                                                                                                     
remains his choice; the heart-attack prone doctor has no such choice.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Christopher White, 7 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION J. CLINICAL 
PSYCHIATRY 76 (2005) (reviewing WILLIAM GLASSER, WARNING: PSYCHIATRY CAN BE 
HAZARDOUS TO YOUR MENTAL HEALTH (2003)) (commenting on Dr. William Glasser’s 
“choice theory,” which posits that “everything contained in the DSM-IV-TR is a result of an 
individual’s brain creatively expressing its unhappiness. . . .  When one meets [one’s 
internal] needs, the brain should feel less psychic stress and stop manifesting what we refer 
to as mental illness”). 
 209. For example, the insurer in Colby v. Union Security Insurance Company & 
Management Company for Merrimack Anesthesia Associates Long Term Disability Plan, 
discussed more fully infra at Part IV.A., claimed in its motion for summary judgment that 
the “‘mere risk of relapse into a prior, self controlled condition’” could not preclude the 
insured from working in her occupation. Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co. & Mgmt. Co. for 
Merrimack Anesthesia Assocs. Long Term Disability Plan, 705 F. 3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(emphasis added). 
 210. See Karen B. Domino et al., Risk Factors for Relapse in Health Care 
Professionals with Substance Use Disorders, 293 JAMA 1453, 1456 (2005).  
 211. See A. Thomas McLellan et al., Drug Dependence, A Chronic Medical Illness: 
Implications for Treatment, Insurance, and Outcomes Evaluation, 284 JAMA 1689, 1693 
(2000) (noting that treatment adherence rates among drug addicts are comparable to “other 
chronic disorders” such as hypertension, diabetes, and asthma).  
 212. Courts have recognized the danger posed by an anesthesiologist’s return to the 
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intimation that Stanford was “faking it” to receive benefits, his situation 
clearly implicated the primary purpose of long term disability benefits—“to 




B. The 1st Circuit’s Response 
1. Introduction 
The First Circuit considered whether the risk of relapse into addiction 
can rise to the level of a current disability in Colby v. Union Security 
Insurance Company & Management Company for Merrimack Anesthesia 
Associates Long Term Disability Plan,
214
 creating a split with the Fourth 
Circuit in the process.
215
  The facts in Colby are remarkably similar to those 
in Stanford.
216
  Dr. Colby worked as a staff anesthesiologist at a hospital in 
Massachusetts, and had access to opioids, including Fentanyl, as part of her 
practice.
217
  Colby’s schedule was grueling: she worked between 60 and 90 
hours per week, and a combination of her heavy work responsibilities and 
persistent lower back pain due to a degenerative disc disease lead Colby to 
begin self-medicating with waste opioids.
218
  Colby’s Fentanyl addiction 
                                                                                                     
same employment position following relapse.  See, e.g., Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Financial 
Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 785, 796 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (noting that denying benefits to an 
anesthesiologist “unless and until . . . an actual relapse of [] narcotics addiction [occurs]. . . . 
is untenable given the serious risk this poses to public health and safety . . . ”).  
 213. Stanford v. Cont’l. Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 362 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J., 
dissenting). 
 214. See Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co. & Mgmt. Co. for Merrimack Anesthesia Assocs. 
Long Term Disability Plan, 705 F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir. 2013) (finding that insurer acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to consider whether the plaintiff’s risk of relapse 
constituted a current disability). 
 215. See id. at 59 (“Although we recognize that our decision creates a circuit 
split . . . .”). 
 216. Just as importantly, the relevant language in the long-term disability policies at 
issue is substantively very similar.  Colby’s plan provided that an individual was totally 
disabled if an “injury, sickness, or pregnancy” required the “regular care and attendance of a 
doctor” and prevented the individual from performing at least one of the material duties of 
that individual’s regular occupation. Complaint, infra note 222, at 4.  The term “sickness” 
was left undefined, but the plan elsewhere made clear that the term included both physical 
and mental illness.  Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 603 F. Supp. 2d 223, 237 (D. Mass. 
2009).  
 217. Complaint, infra note 222, at 5–6, Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 818 F. Supp. 
2d 365 (D. Mass. 2011), 2007 WL 4581436. 
 218. Id. 
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was discovered roughly one year later when she was found asleep at a table 
in the hospital and asked to undergo a urine drug screen.
219
  Within weeks, 
Colby was admitted to an intensive inpatient substance abuse treatment 
program, where she was diagnosed with opioid dependence, as well as 
major depression and obsessive-compulsive personality traits.
220
  Like 
Stanford, Colby’s plan administrator, Union Security Insurance Company 




Colby’s plan defined total disability as an “injury, sickness, or 
pregnancy” that required the “regular care and attendance of a doctor,” and 
prevented Colby from performing at least one of the “material duties” of 
her regular occupation.
222
  Coverage according to the initial “own 
occupation” standard could continue for up to 36 months.
223
  After the 
initial 36-month period, Colby would be required to meet the more 
demanding “any occupation” test, requiring proof of her inability to 
perform any “gainful occupation for which [her] education, training, and 
experience qualifie[d] [her], with reasonable accommodations.”
224
  On 
appeal to the First Circuit, Colby challenged only USIC’s denial of 
disability benefits for the 36-month “own occupation” period.
225
  
2. The Insurer’s “All or Nothing” Defense 
Before reaching the First Circuit, USIC had argued before the district 
court that Colby could not be disabled within the meaning of her disability 
policy unless she was currently addicted to opioids.
226
  Unpersuaded, the 
                                                                                                     
 219. Id. at 7.  
 220. Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co. & Mgmt. Co. for Merrimack Anesthesia Assocs. 
Long Term Disability Plan, 705 F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir. 2013).  
 221. Id. The insurer’s reasoning echoed that employed by Continental in Stanford: 
“‘[R]isk for relapse is not the same as a current disability.’” Colby v. Assurant Emp. 
Benefits, 603 F. Supp. 2d 223, 235 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 222. Complaint at 4, Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 818 F. Supp. 2d 365 (D. Mass. 
2011). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co. & Mgmt. Co. for Merrimack Anesthesia Assocs. 
Long Term Disability Plan, 705 F.3d at 62 n.4 (explaining that the district court found Colby 
ineligible for benefits beyond the 36-month period, a finding that Colby did not dispute). 
 226. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant USIC’s Cross-Motion for 
Judgment on the Record and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Record 
at 16, Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 605 F. Supp. 2d 223 (D. Mass. 2009) (“There is no 
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district court remanded USIC’s denial of benefits.
227
  The district court 
emphasized that the terms of the plan did not distinguish between mental 
and physical disability, and USIC had admitted at oral argument that an 
employee suffering from a physical ailment—such as coronary artery 
disease—that created a “dangerously high risk of heart attack,” would be 
covered.
228
  The district court reasoned that the same standard should have 
been applied to future risk caused by mental disabilities.
229
  USIC’s 
categorical exclusion of the risk of relapse as a possible basis for disability 
was therefore arbitrary and capricious.
230
  USIC had failed to conduct the 
proper factual analysis—“i.e. whether the probability of Dr. Colby 
relapsing upon a return to the practice of medicine was so high that she 
could not perform a material duty of a physician.”
231
  On remand, USIC 
displayed some stubbornness by simply reiterating its former conclusion 
that “risk of potential future disability is not considered a current disability 
for which benefits are available.”
232
  Rather than remanding a second time, 
the district court retroactively awarded Colby her long-term disability 
benefits for the entire initial 36-month “own occupation” period.
233
   
USIC was technically correct in claiming that it was not obligated to 
pay benefits for a “potential risk:” insurers promise coverage for specified 
events (a car accident or broken leg) and not the risk that such an event will 
occur.  The risk itself, i.e. the likelihood that a contemplated event will 
actually occur, is incorporated into the insured’s cost of coverage.  But 
USIC’s claim merely avoids the real question: under what circumstances, if 
any, can the risk of future injury rise to the level of a current disability?  
USIC had already admitted that so-called “potential risk” could constitute a 
current disability in the case of heart-attack patients in high-stress work 
                                                                                                     
evidence that plaintiff was addicted to opioids after November 20, 2004. Therefore, plaintiff 
was not disabled after that date.”). 
 227. Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 603 F. Supp. 2d 223, 246 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 228. Id. at 241.  
 229. See id. (“[I]f, as USIC admits, the Plan covers future risk of relapse resulting from 
physical sickness, the terms of the plan require that future risk of relapse caused by mental 
illness, such as opioid dependence, be covered as well.”). 
 230. See id. (“Fabricating an exception out of whole cloth that contravenes existing 
terms and interpretations of the Plan is the very definition of arbitrary and capricious.”). 
 231. Id. at 246. 
 232. Id. 374 (D. Mass. 2011). 
 233. Id. at 384. 
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environments.
234
  Categorically excluding the risk of relapse into addiction 
smacked of discrimination.
235
   
The Court of Appeal’s analysis followed along the lines of Judge 
Wilkinson’s dissenting opinion in Stanford:  the language of the plan did 
not mention risk of relapse, “let alone exclude risk of relapse as a potential 
basis for a finding of disability.”
236
  The plan administrator’s discretion to 
interpret the text of the plan, furthermore, did not extend to importing an 
“unwritten proviso.”
237
 Thus, even under the deferential abuse of discretion 
standard of review dictated by Firestone, an insurer’s blanket exclusion of 




The First Circuit’s decision in Colby thus suggests but does not 
provide a sure answer to the question of what evidence would be sufficient 
for a finding of disability based on the risk of relapse into addiction.
239
  The 
court notes that the “record generally suggests that the plaintiff was at a 
high risk of relapse into opioid dependence following her discharge from 
inpatient care,” but offers little further guidance on how courts should 
weigh such evidence.
240
  Instead, the decision appears to rest to a large 
extent on the insurer’s obstinacy: numerous statements by the court 
reference USIC’s “categorical approach,” “single-minded insistence,” and 
its decision to “[stick] to its guns” in the face of the district court’s order to 
“find the facts” relating to the significance of the risk of relapse.
241
  The 
                                                                                                     
 234. Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 603 F. Supp. 2d 223, 241 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 235. The district court went as far as to assert that the Stanford court—on which USIC 
relied for its categorical exclusion argument—had committed a “moralistic error” in 
separating risk of relapse into physical sickness from relapse into mental illness.  Id. at 242.   
 236. Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co. & Mgmt. Co. for Merrimack Anesthesia Assocs. 
Long Term Disability Plan, 705 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir. 2013).  
 237. Id.  
 238. See id. (noting that the disability benefit plan’s total silence on risk of relapse was 
“telling,” because the discretion of ERISA plan administrators is “cabined by the text of the 
plan and the plain meaning of the words used.”). 
 239. For one proposed test, see Jonah Kind, Future Harm as a Current Disability: 
Insurance Coverage for a Risk of Substance Abuse Relapse Under ERISA, 108 NW. U. L. 
REV. 639, 657 (2014) (arguing that whether a given employee’s risk of relapse into addiction 
constitutes a current disability should be assessed from the standpoint of the “reasonable, 
non-insured person”).  This standard would alleviate some moral hazard concerns by ruling 
out “minor job-associated risks” that would not deter the reasonable uninsured person from 
continuing to work, while still allowing recovery for substantial risks that would cause the 
reasonable person to leave work even in the absence of disability insurance.  
 240. Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co. & Mgmt. Co. for Merrimack Anesthesia Assocs. Long 
Term Disability Plan, 705 F.3d at 63. 
 241. Id. at 64–65.  
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court emphasized that its holding was narrow, pivoting on the “plain 




Colby suggests that courts are likely to be unreceptive to an insurer’s 
outright refusal to entertain a beneficiary’s argument that her risk of relapse 
into addiction constitutes a disability, at least where the terms of the plan do 
not expressly preclude that interpretation.  Importantly, however, Colby did 
not hold that the plan administrator unlawfully discriminated between 
mental and physical conditions.
243
  Thus, even in the First Circuit, Colby is 
no panacea for a mentally disabled employee seeking benefits under her 
employer’s long-term disability policy.  Much more is needed if employees 
who become mentally disabled are to be assured non-discriminatory 
treatment under their employee disability insurance policies.  
V. Proposed Reforms 
Long-term disability insurance is often overlooked by employees and 
employers alike, and has long fallen under the shadow of health insurance.  
Consequently, despite important recent advances toward full mental health 
parity in health insurance, such as passage of final rules implementing the 
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act,
244
 there has been little 
corresponding effort to achieve parity in the field of disability benefits.
245
  
Nevertheless, long-term disability insurance remains a viable and often 
indispensable tool for protecting the most valuable financial resource of 
most employees—their income.  This tool should not be limited by insurers 
according to whether a particular disability is categorized as mental or 
physical.  
                                                                                                     
 242. Id. at 67.   
 243. The court found that a benefits determination like USIC’s could not be “reasoned” 
when the plan administrator “sidesteps the central inquiry,” but emphasized in a footnote 
that although the district court below had held that USIC “unlawfully discriminated between 
physical and mental conditions,” it “[took] no view of this reasoning.” Id. at 67, n.10. 
 244. See supra notes 6–8, 17 and accompanying text (explaining the impact of the 
MHPAEA on mental health insurance). 
 245. One notable exception is a state bill recently introduced in the Massachusetts 
House of Representatives that would require parity in both short and long term disability 
benefits.  See H.R. 836, 188th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2013). 
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A. Expand the Scope of Allowable Remedies Under ERISA 
The extent to which ERISA limits the remedies available to insured 
plaintiffs is evident when one compares the Fourth Circuit’s holding in 
Stanford and other cases governed by ERISA, with insurance decisions in 
other contexts not governed by ERISA.  In Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance 
Company v. JT Walker Industries, Incorporated,
246
 the Fourth Circuit 
reversed a district court’s ruling that punitive damages could not be 
awarded absent a concurrent award of actual or consequential damages.
247
  
Punitive damages, the court held, may be awarded whenever the plaintiff 
makes out a cause of action in tort for the insurer’s bad faith conduct in 
“willful, wanton, or reckless” disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.
248
  This rule 
stands in marked contrast to the rule governing ERISA disability benefits 
policies, which permits no punitive damages for the insurer’s bad faith—no 
matter how discriminatory, and regardless of how clearly an ERISA 
beneficiary’s rights under her policy have been violated by the plan 
administrator’s “wanton disregard.”
249
  Similarly, in Ace v. Aetna Life Ins. 
Co.,
250
 a state employee in a non-ERISA plan successfully recovered 
damages for both wrongful denial of benefits and emotional distress.
251
   
While punitive damages are unlikely ever to be available under 
ERISA, even a slight expansion of the scope of available equitable 
remedies under section 502(a)(3) could represent a significant move 
forward for mentally disabled plaintiffs challenging denials of benefits.  
This expansion should follow along the lines of Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion in CIGNA Corporation v. Amara, which suggested the availability 
of equitable money damages (surcharge) within ERISA’s remedial 
provisions.
252
  Surcharge would allow employees wrongfully denied 
                                                                                                     
 246. See Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. JT Walker Ind., Inc., No. 12–2256, 12–2350, 
2014 WL 504086, at *10 (4th Cir. Feb. 10, 2014) (rejecting the district court’s holding that 
failure to award actual or consequential damages precluded jury’s award of punitive 
damages to insured party). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See supra Parts III.C.1 and III.C.3., discussing the limited nature of ERISA’s 
remedial scheme. 
 250. See Ace v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1241, 1249 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding 
the district court’s finding that insurer acted in bad faith by, inter alia, failing to investigate 
insured’s claim or gather medical evidence, failing to disclose its review standards, and 
failing to provide a reasonable explanation of its denial). 
 251. Id. at 1250. 
 252. See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1879–80 (2010) (explaining that the 
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benefits to recover monetary relief for losses suffered.
253
  Breathing life into 
ERISA’s neglected equitable relief provision would provide beneficiaries a 
meaningful way to redress fiduciary breaches by ERISA plan 
administrators—relief that is not provided by mere recovery of “benefits 
due” under the terms of the plan.
254
 Nevertheless, it is still unclear how 
receptive courts will be to any expansion in the scope of ERISA remedies. 
Any positive changes are likely to be incremental at best, and the inherent 
costs and long duration of most insurance litigation will no doubt 
discourage many plaintiffs from bringing even meritorious claims.   
Even more concerning, insurers fight tooth and nail against any 
expansion of the potential remedies available under ERISA.  Recent 
litigation over the availability of equitable disgorgement as a remedy under 
ERISA 502(a)(3) provides the perfect example of this phenomenon.
255
  In 
Rochow v. Life Insurance Company of North America,
256
 the Sixth Circuit 
upheld a district court’s award to an ERISA beneficiary of $910,629.24 in 
past due benefits, plus nearly $3.8 million in disgorged profits under the 
equitable theory of unjust enrichment.
257
  The court held that disgorgement 
of this sum, which represented a reasonable estimate of the insurer’s profit 
on the wrongfully withheld benefit amount, was an appropriate remedy 
under § 502(a)(3) despite a prior award of “benefits due” under 
§ 502(a)(1)(B).
258
  The decision predictably triggered the filing of an 
amicus brief by the American Council of Life Insurers, which argued that 
                                                                                                     
remedy of surcharge was exclusively equitable prior to the merger of law and equity, and 
extended to a breach of trust committed by a fiduciary). 
 253. See Brief for the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant’s Petition 
for Panel and En Bank Rehearing, Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330 (2005) (Nos. 03-5035, -
5055) (explaining that surcharge is “akin to the legal remedy of damages in that it can 
include monetary relief for losses suffered by the plaintiff”).   
 254. See Rochow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 12–2074, 2015 WL 925794, at *14 
(6th Cir. Mar. 5, 2015) (Helene, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (opining that 
equitable relief was justified based on insurer’s “extraordinary delay” of nearly seven years 
between the wrongful denial of benefits and when it finally paid all benefits due to the 
injured beneficiary).  
 255. Section 502(a)(3) permits suits to obtain “other appropriate equitable relief” to 
redress violations of the fiduciary obligations which ERISA impose on plan administrators.  
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)((3) (2009). 
 256. Rochow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 737 F.3d 415, 426 (6th Cir. 2013), rev’d en 
banc,  No. 12–2074, 2015 WL 925794 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 2015)  (upholding a district court’s 
award ordering the insurer to disgorge $3.8 million under the equitable theory of unjust 
enrichment). 
 257. Id. at 431. 
 258. Id. at 428–31. 
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the ruling would “significantly increase the risk, cost, and uncertainty 
associated with offering [employee benefits], as well as the expense and 
burden associated with litigating denial of benefit cases.”
259
  One week 
later, the Sixth Circuit vacated Rochow and granted rehearing en banc.
260
   
On rehearing, the en banc Sixth Circuit held that an ERISA plan 
participant whose benefits are wrongfully denied cannot recover both 
“benefits due” under section  502(a)(1)(B) and disgorged profits under 
section  502(a)(3), absent a showing that the remedy under section  
502(a)(1)(B) is “inadequate.”
261
 The majority viewed Rochow’s claims 
under the two sections as essentially identical; permitting relief under both 
would thus amount to an “impermissible duplicative recovery,” contrary to 
both Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, and “beyond the ken of 
ERISA make-whole remedies.”
 262
 A six-judge dissent argued to the 
contrary that Rochow had in fact suffered two distinct injuries: first through 
the insurer’s arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits, and second through 
the insurer’s breach of its fiduciary obligation to “discharge [its] duties . . . 
solely in the interest of the [plan’s] beneficiaries.”
263
  
Interestingly, Judge Helene N. White, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, noted that both the majority and the dissenting opinions 
agreed that equitable disgorgement was a remedy available under ERISA, 
at least in appropriate circumstances.
264
  Judge White emphasized, 
moreover, that in remanding the case to the district court for a possible 
award of prejudgment interest (an equitable remedy),
265
 even the majority 
seemed to recognize that Rochow was not “made whole” by the award of 
                                                                                                     
 259. Brief for the Am. Council of Life Insurers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition 
for Rehearing En Banc of Defendant-Appellant, Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. at 2, Rochow v. 
Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 737 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 2013), rev’d en banc,  No. 12–2074, 2015 
WL 925794 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 2015). 
 260. Order at 1, Rochow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2014) (No. 12-
2074).  
 261. Rochow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 12–2074, 2015 WL 925794, at *4 (6th 
Cir. Mar. 5, 2015). 
 262. Id. at *4–*5. 
 263. Id. at *17–*18 (Stranch, J., dissenting). 
 264. See id. at *13 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A]ll appear 
to agree disgorgement of profits is a potential remedy under ERISA. The two opinions part 
on whether Rochow’s fiduciary-duty claim is merely a repackaging of his benefits-denial 
claim.”). 
 265. See Fotta v. Trs. of United Mine Workers of Am., Health & Ret. Fund of 1974, 
165 F.3d 209, 214 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that “an award of interest is an equitable remedy 
enforcing an ERISA plan provision, albeit an implied one, within the meaning of section 
502(a)(3)(B)”). 
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benefits and attorney’s fees.
266
  Rather than announcing, as the majority 
seemed to, that equitable relief is always unavailable in a benefits-denial 
case, Judge White would have focused the court’s inquiry on whether 
equitable relief is “appropriate under the circumstances” of each case, with 
the question whether the beneficiary’s equitable claim duplicates his 
benefits-denial claim as merely one factor to be considered.
267
  
The facts of Rochow illustrate the need for equitable remedies in the 
ERISA context even when there has been a previous award of “benefits 
due” under the terms of a plan. Rochow’s insurer avoided paying benefits 
for nearly seven years, and tripled its returns on those wrongfully withheld 
benefits.
268
  ERISA plan administrators have a clear financial incentive to 
deny disability claims even if such denials are later overturned on appeal, 
because profits on the wrongfully denied claim amounts may far exceed the 
cost of litigation.
269
  Permitting equitable remedies such as disgorgement of 
profits under ERISA section  502(a)(3) promotes fairness in claims 
processing and is consistent with the “higher-than-marketplace” standards 
of conduct that ERISA places on insurers.
270
 There is little reason to create 
a blanket rule denying concurrent awards of both benefits due and “other 
appropriate equitable relief” in the relatively small number of cases, like 
Rochow’s, that involve insurer misconduct and truly “call for an equitable 




                                                                                                     
 266. See Rochow, 2015 WL 925794, at *14  (White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Clearly, Rochow was not made whole by the award of benefits and 
attorney’s fees. . . .  The majority concedes as much in its remand order directing the district 
court to consider the award of interest . . . .”). 
 267. See id. at *13 (“I do not agree that the dispositive inquiry governing the 
availability of equitable relief under § 502(a)(3) is whether the claim is a repackaging of a 
benefits-denial claim.”). 
 268. See id. at *14 (“Nearly seven years elapsed between the time [Rochow] sought 
benefits and when LINA finally paid all benefits that were due.”).  
 269. See Rochow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 737 F.3d 415, 426 (6th Cir. 2013), rev’d 
en banc,  No. 12–2074, 2015 WL 925794 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 2015) (“If no remedy beyond the 
award of benefits were allowed, insurance companies would have the perverse incentive to 
deny benefits for as long as possible, risking only litigation costs in the process.”). 
 270. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 115 (2008) (explaining that 
ERISA § 1104(a)(1) imposes a duty on plan administrators to process claims solely in the 
interest of plan beneficiaries).  
 271. See Rochow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 12–2074, 2015 WL 925794, at *15 
(6th Cir. Mar. 5, 2015) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (opining that 
equitable remedies would be appropriate when, for example, a denial of benefits is not the 
product of an individual claim evaluator’s “misguided evaluation,” but rather an 
organizational policy to “delay paying valid claims for as long as possible”). 
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B. Amend the MHPAEA to Include Protections Against Discrimination in 
Disability Insurance 
Congress should amend the MHPAEA to include provisions 
mandating non-discrimination in the terms of individual and group 
disability insurance policies.  The case for parity in mental disability 
benefits is, if anything, even stronger than the argument for parity in mental 
health benefits.
272
  Many of the financial and actuarial reasons that might 
justify treating mentally and physically disabled health insurance 
participants differently are largely absent in the disability benefit context 
because the costs of income replacement (unlike the costs of providing 
health care) do not vary according to whether an individual’s inability to 
work results from mental or physical disability.
273
  Furthermore, even a 
sweeping federal requirement mandating parity in mental disability benefits 
across all disability insurance policies would leave undisturbed numerous 
nondiscriminatory means of combating problems of moral hazard in long 
term disability policies.  For example, insurers would retain the ability to 
employ elimination periods, which effectively screen out many temporary 
impairments by delaying the onset of benefit payments for a stated 
period.
274
  Other common nondiscriminatory policy limitations, such as the 
“any occupation” standard discussed above, would also remain in place.
275
  
                                                                                                     
 272. There are legitimate arguments for treating mental disabilities differently in a 
health plan, such as limiting exposure to “skyrocketing drug prices,” but such arguments are 
inapposite when applied to disability plans, in which benefits are tied to wages and thus do 
not reflect the cost of treating a given disability.  See Iwata v. Intel Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 
135, 150 (2004) (“[T]he basic element of actuarial risk in a disability benefit plan is the 
likelihood that an employee will become disabled. There is virtually no volatility in the 
amount the plan will have to pay out to individual employees, because [benefit amounts] 
will generally be fixed within a limited range.”).  
 273. See id. at 151 (asserting that because it is more difficult to find actuarial 
justifications for disparities between mental and physical disability benefits in disability 
plans, differential treatment is likely the result of “beliefs that mental illness is less ‘real’ or 
debilitating than physical injury” or that the mentally disabled are “‘faking it’”). 
 274. See, e.g., Castle v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 162 F. Supp. 2d 842, 843–46 
(S.D. Ohio 2001) (describing ERISA beneficiary’s plan terms, including an “elimination 
period” of 180 days from first day of total disability, during which no benefits were 
payable).  During the elimination period, the insured must satisfy the plan’s definition of 
“own occupation” total disability—typically the inability to “perform each and every 
material duty” of the beneficiary’s “regular occupation”—but may not begin to receive 
benefits until after the elimination period has elapsed.  Id. at 845. 
 275. See supra notes197–199 and accompanying text (explaining the difference 
between the “own occupation” and “any occupation” standards found in disability insurance 
policies). 
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Insurers will not be left without the tools they need to counter the twin 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection,
276
 and thus maintain the 
profitability of the disability insurance industry.  What insurers should not 
be able to do is profit by offering reduced coverage to persons suffering 
from mental as opposed to physical disabilities.  
VI. Conclusion 
The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 has been 
hailed by some as the “final word” on mental health parity.
277
  It is not.  
Much work remains to be done to ensure that those suffering from disabling 
mental impairments are able to receive the rehabilitation they need in order 
to participate as active members of society.  Part of this rehabilitation may 
come in the form of long term disability insurance, which can provide an 
invaluable safety net by replacing needed income when mental illness 
prevents an individual from working.  An employee who contracts with her 
employer or an insurer for disability benefits to protect herself and her 
family in the event of an unexpected and disabling illness should not face a 
twenty-four month cap on those benefits simply because her illness is 
classified as “mental” rather than “physical.” 
                                                                                                     
 276. See supra Part II.A. (describing the impact of moral hazard and adverse selection 
on the disability insurance market). 
 277. See Jackie Calmes & Robert Pear, Rules to Require Equal Coverage for Mental 
Ills, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2004), at A1, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/11/08/us/politics/rules-to-require-equal-coverage-for-mental-ills.html?_r=0 
(quoting an unnamed “senior [Obama] administration official” as claiming that the 
MHPAEA is “‘kind of the final word on parity’”). 
